PHIL 111 Chapter Notes - Chapter 5: Categorical Imperative, Atheism, Blackboard
The Political Philosophy of Kant Session 7 April 25, 1967
157
75 Deleted “used for…I mean.”
76 Deleted “It must…must be….”
77 Deleted “that is….”
78 Deleted “The second— Reinken: ‘By this principle all maxims—’ LS: Yeah.”
79 Deleted “Reinken: ‘The will is thus not only subject to the law but subject in such a way that it must be
regarded also as self-legislative and only for this reason as being subject to the law (of which it can regard
itself as the author). In the foregoing mode of conception, in which imperatives are conceived universally
either as conformity to law by actions—a conformity which is similar to a natural order—’ LS: No, let me
see here. Can I have yours? 431. 431. Where does it begin? Oh, this one here. Reinken: ‘I have begun—’
LS: This [inaudible words] Reinken: ‘Thus this principle must—’? LS: Yeah, begin here [inaudible
word].”
80 Deleted “meaning….”
81 Deleted “In….”
82 Deleted “Now what is the reason….”
83 Deleted “And this is very….”
84 Deleted “that is not…that…to do.”
85 Deleted “to accept what he….”
86 Deleted “And this is….”
87 Deleted “it….”
88 Deleted “He….”
89 Deleted “Reinken: [inaudible words] The principle of every will…432…changes in the middle…oh
second paragraph. 432… LS: I don’t know. Oh, here. Reinken: [inaudible words] ‘But if we think of a will
giving—’ LS: No.”
90 Deleted “Ah, paragraphing not clear. [inaudible words].”
91 Deleted “you….”
92 Deleted “Namely, like….”
93 Deleted “here I have to have…if an action is to be….”
94 Deleted “our….”
95 Deleted “and has….”
96 Deleted “see…but the question is we would have to….”
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98 Deleted “Kant….”
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101 Deleted “In….”
102 Deleted “on….”
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104 Deleted “which is based….”
105 Deleted “Kant….”
106 Deleted “be….”
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The Political Philosophy of Kant Session 8 April 27, 1967
158
Session 8: April 27, 1967
Leo Strauss: [in progress] —to look at . . . all of you have written the papers on the third
section of the Foundations had this difficult task of course, but you did it very well. And
now1 let us see. I’m sure that those who have not read the third section, and even some
who have read it, will have had great difficulties in following your very good summary
and presentation of Kant’s point.
Now2 where do we stand at the end of the preceding section or, in other words, what is
the function of this last section? The last section being undoubtedly the most difficult part
of the whole work. Kant has given, in the first two sections, an analysis of what3
everyone who has ever had the feeling of doing wrong or willing something wrong [and]
what is implied in that. And Kant claims he has made clear this implication better and
more adequately than any earlier philosopher, and the formulation is the categoric
imperative: there is such a moral law which commands in this categoric manner without
having any content as such, yet necessarily leading us to moral contents.
But Kant has not proven that this may not be a completely chimeric thing. In other words,
that this is so, men judge morally, and if we understand this moral judgment, if we take it
seriously, we are led to the categoric imperative. But in fact, what happened might be
some father image, you know, which has become sublimated so that it is only duty,
intelligible duty and no longer any father figure (you must have [a] further expression)4
or anything else. So in other words, the most important question, is morality something
real, is not yet answered at all until we come to the last twenty pages.
And what Kant does there is called by him a derivation of morality: a derivation, meaning
from something more fundamental. And there is a great difficulty here, because if the
categoric imperative is unconditioned, how can it be derived from anything else? And
therefore the solution which Kant found a few years later in his Critique of Practical
Reason, namely, that the moral imperative, the categorical imperative is a fact of reason,
the fact of pure reason. A fact irreducible to anything else. We could not possibly figure it
out that there is such a thing if we were not confronted by it, or in more present-day
English, if we did not experience it, that it is there. This is a much clearer position than
the one taken here. But how hard it was to arrive at that one sees from the fact that Kant
was seeking for such a thing for a decade and more, and such a mind arrived originally
only on this very inadequate statement in the Foundations, section 3.5
But precisely because6 the . . . of such a mind sees7 the alternative with which Kant, as it
were, played for some time, and finally admitting that they led nowhere . . . Now what
would a derivation of the moral law from something else mean? What is the ethical
doctrine, the pre-Kantian ethical doctrine which Kant respected most? Yes?
Student: The rationalist8 doctrine which derives the Christian morality from the
ontological concept of perfection.
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Document Summary
78 deleted the second reinken: by this principle all maxims " ls: yeah. In the foregoing mode of conception, in which imperatives are conceived universally either as conformity to law by actions a conformity which is similar to a natural order " ls: no, let me see here. 89 deleted reinken: [inaudible words] the principle of every will 432 changes in the middle oh second paragraph. Reinken: [inaudible words] but if we think of a will giving " ls: no. 93 deleted here i have to have if an action is to be . 96 deleted see but the question is we would have to . Leo strauss: [in progress] to look at . all of you have written the papers on the third section of the foundations had this difficult task of course, but you did it very well.
