POL SCI 163A Chapter Notes - Chapter 1: Tyrant
Spatial Cues in Politics
Intro
-Peasant can’t pay harvest tax —> gets tortured by scribe and Nubians
-Abuses have occurred often to many different people until the right to vote became
widespread, dating around 1750
The Passivity of the Peasant
-Despite abuse there is passiveness
-What does the abuse accomplish?
-can’t obtain the harvest tax from the peasant —> to show what failure results in
-done in order to warn other peasants
-Why are other peasants also passive to his abuse?
-peasants will always outnumber the abusers, so they have no need to be passive
Collective Action
-Paradox of Collective Action: can only avoid the risk if everyone participates but each
individual must decide to participate for everyone to
-if the peasant knew the amount of people participating and the outcome —> no risk
-this is the same case for voting
-miniscule effort to vote is overcome by the probability their single vote will
decide the winner
-Self-interest calculates a cost of action vs utility for the reward of action
-reward when put against cost is typically avoided because of the negative, this is
shown in a card experiment
The Activity of the Scribe, the Attendants, and the Nubians
-Oppression and liberation are decided by choices by the people and those in charge
-opposing collectivities: those who produce (peasants) and those who take (govt)
-balance maintained as long as each can obtain what they need
-the term “looter” acts with a negative connotation
-however the scribe is doing this for a general good
-States first appear w/ better weapons as the looters can shift balance for them instead
-combat as ultimate collective action
-to win most soldiers must choose to fight over running while not being regulated
by the leader
-“State formation encounters obstacles that are at least analogous whether in ancient or
modern times”
-Principles who choose a tax rate, agents that get them, and taxpayers that pay
-this balance depends on resolution of collective action problems
-The Scribe acts contrary to his own interest
-intimidation is risky for fear of revolt
Document Summary
Peasant can"t pay harvest tax > gets tortured by scribe and nubians. Abuses have occurred often to many different people until the right to vote became widespread, dating around 1750. Can"t obtain the harvest tax from the peasant > to show what failure results in. Peasants will always outnumber the abusers, so they have no need to be passive. Paradox of collective action: can only avoid the risk if everyone participates but each individual must decide to participate for everyone to. If the peasant knew the amount of people participating and the outcome > no risk. Self-interest calculates a cost of action vs utility for the reward of action. Miniscule effort to vote is overcome by the probability their single vote will decide the winner. Reward when put against cost is typically avoided because of the negative, this is shown in a card experiment. However the scribe is doing this for a general good.
