PHIL 111 Chapter Notes - Chapter 1: Deism, Practical Philosophy, Practical Reason
The Political Philosophy of Kant Session 5 April 18, 1967
97
Student: That were we to imagine other rational beings who—
LS: Yes.
Same Student: aren’t necessarily constructed with human nature but are rational they too
would have to follow the laws. So that must be the premise and not—
LS:
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And this is not merely a play of the imagination but the necessity to think of such
possible beings. Now which is the most important case involved?
Same Student: God.
LS: God. In other words, if morality were essentially related to human nature, then there
would be no reason why our notions of justice, for example, could in any way be applied
to God. Yes?
Student: What makes it so evident that they should be? It would seem that—
LS: That there?
Same Student: That they should be. I mean, most cases—I would imagine certainly in,
you know, in cases of the religions now present there is a notion of the unfathomableness
of God’s mercy and of His justice—
LS: Ya, but still, from Kant’s point of view that is not bearable. And the enlightened part
of his readers, meaning those who
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were not believers in revealed religion but rather
deists, they would have granted this without a question. Now the point is this: while Kant
destroys (or claims to destroy) speculative or theoretical theology (metaphysics), the
possibility of God’s existence is for Kant essential, and we must never be . . . Therefore
this is a necessary idea of reason, and therefore we have to consider this possibility of an
amoral or transmoral God that must be present, and morality must be of such a character
so as to include the application to God. And therefore, as Mr. Schaefer mentioned, the
veracity of God demanded by Descartes in a famous passage
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is necessary. Yes.
God must be moral, in the sense in which we ought to be moral. That is to say, what we
understand by God is that He is this holy being, and a holy being means a being which is
perfectly just, perfectly moral . . . Of man we cannot say that. We have no reason to
assume that any man is wholly, perfectly, just. But we know that we ought to be perfectly
just. So in other words, the biblical notion that God’s ways are not our ways, and our
moral notions are in no way applicable to God
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in any specific point, that is . . . Yes.
Let us read the sequel, Mr. Reinken.
Mr. Reinken:
The Political Philosophy of Kant Session 5 April 18, 1967
98
Thus not only are moral laws together with their principles essentially
different from all practical knowledge in which there is anything
empirical, but all moral philosophy rests solely on its pure part. Applied to
man, it borrows nothing from knowledge of him (anthropology) but gives
him, as a rational being, a priori laws. No doubt these laws require a
power of judgment sharpened by experience, partly in order to decide in
what cases they apply and partly to procure for them an access to man’s
will and an impetus to their practice. For man is affected by so many
inclinations that, though he is capable of the idea of a practical pure
reason, he is not so easily able to make it concretely effective in the
conduct of his life.
xi
LS: So in other words, this is meant to be in passing. We still need the power of judgment
in order to apply the moral laws properly. Now what does this mean? For example, I
know that I ought not to lie under any circumstances, that I ought never to say anything
which is not true. Of course, I must know the truth. I mean, if I say what is objectively a
falsehood but believing it to be true, then I do not lie . . . This doesn’t cause any difficulty
as far as Kant is concerned. But there are other points. I gave you the example: if I say
“Yours sincerely,” and I am not yours sincerely at all, then I need some judgment in order
to see, is it worthwhile to say “Yours insincerely.” [Laughter] Or is it . . . things which
are rightly disregarded. So we still need judgment. But the main point: the law itself is
wholly independent
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of any experience, and including human experience.
Yes. Now, yes. Next paragraph, please.
Mr. Reinken:
A metaphysics of morals is therefore indispensable, not merely because of
motives to speculate on the source of the a priori practical principles which lie in
our reason—
xii
LS: So in other words, not only because we as theoretical men wish to have a complete
survey of all a priori knowledge which we possess, which is a legitimate concern for
Kant, but this is not the sole reason and not the most important reason.
Mr. Reinken:
but also because morals themselves remain subject to all kinds of corruption so
long as the guide and supreme norm for their correct estimation is lacking. For it
is not sufficient to that which should be morally good that it conform to the law; it
must be done for the sake of the law.
xiii
LS: Now let us stop here. This is a distinction which, if developed, means the distinction
between legality and morality, and which is crucial for Kant. Now an action which is
legal according to the moral law is not for this reason moral, because it may not have
xi
Ibid., 5-6.
xii
Ibid., 6.
xiii
Ibid.
