CAOT 31 Lecture Notes - Lecture 19: Robert W. Vishny, Coordination Game, Petrobras
12 Oct 2020
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Document Summary
Core material: shleifer, andrei and robert vishny: "corruption," the quarterly journal of economics, mit press, vol. [sv: brunetti, aymo and weder, beatrice: a free press is bad news for corruption , journal of public economics, [bw: ted talk: how to expose the corrupt, by peter eigen (transparency international, currell, dan and tracy davis bradley, greased palms, giant headaches, harvard business review, september, transparency international: corruption perceptions index. Comments and suggestions: the chapter from the textbook by jonathan gruber assigned for the previous tutorial contains parts that are of interest for this tutorial too. Questions/problems: (based on the ted talk by peter eigen) many companies who are accused of corruption claim they do not want/intend to pay bribes, but end up doing it anyway. Try to write down a simple game-theoretic model, using a type of game we have seen in previous tutorials or lectures, and use this model to illustrate the dilemma these companies claim to be facing.
