ECON 710 Final: ECON 710 UW Madison Final Exam 2015a

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turquoisegnu128

31 Jan 2019

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Thus by the delta method, since (cid:12) 6= 0. @(cid:12)(cid:0)(cid:0)(cid:11)2=2(cid:12)(cid:1) (a) the plug-in estimator is ^a = (cid:0)^(cid:11)2=2^(cid:12). (b) notice. A((cid:18)) =0 pn(cid:16)^(cid:18) (cid:0) (cid:18)(cid:17) !d n(cid:0)0; a0v(cid:18)a(cid:1) An estimate of the asymptotic variance is ^a0 ^v(cid:18)^a where. Thus a 95% con(cid:133)dence interval for a is (cid:0)^(cid:11)=^(cid:12) A (c) for a bootstrap percentile interval: for b = 1; :::; b, where b = 1000 or higher: sample n iid observations from the empirical sample, construct the ols estimates ^(cid:18, form ^a(cid:3) 0 + eu2 i + u2 i ) + 2(cid:13) 0(cid:13) 1zi + (cid:13) 2. 1z2 i i + 2(cid:13) 0(cid:13) 1zi + 2(cid:13) 0ui + 2(cid:13) 1ziui. 0 + 2(cid:13) 0(cid:13) 1zi + (cid:13) 2 i(cid:1) + 2(cid:13) 0ui + 2(cid:13) 1ziui(cid:1) i + u2i. 1z2 say, where the error u2i is mean zero (conditionally on zi). This is the reduced form equation for x2 i .

Related Questions

PLEASE ANSWER EACH QUESTION WITH A, B, C, and D. NOT ANSWERING ALL QUESTIONS OR INCORRECT ANSWERS WILL RESULT IN A THUMBS DOWN.

Question 1: Which of the following is not needed for price discrimination to be possible?

		A. The firm must have market power.
		B. The firm must be able to prevent resale and arbitrage.
		C. The firm must eventually learn about its customers' demands.
		D. The firm's customers must have different demand curves.

Question 2: Relative to standard monopoly pricing, first-degree price discrimination results in:

	A.	higher consumer surplus, higher producer surplus, and higher total surplus.
	B.	lower consumer surplus, higher producer surplus, and higher total surplus.
	C.	lower consumer surplus, higher producer surplus, and lower total surplus.
	D.	lower consumer surplus, lower producer surplus, and lower total surplus.

Question 3: Relative to perfect competition, first-degree price discrimination results in:

		A. higher consumer surplus, higher producer surplus, and higher total surplus.
		B. lower consumer surplus, higher producer surplus, and equal total surplus.
		C. lower consumer surplus, higher producer surplus, and equal total surplus.
		D. lower consumer surplus, lower producer surplus, and lower total surplus.

Question 4: If market demand is P = 100 - Q and the firm has a constant marginal cost of 20, then with first-degree price discrimination, the firm's producer surplus will be:

A.	$800.
B.	$1,600.
C.	$2,400.
D.	$3,200.

Question 5: For third-degree discrimination to be possible, which of the following features is not required?

		A. market power
		B. prevention of resale
		C. identification of each customer's demand before purchase
		D. customers with different demand curves

Question 6: A golf course has frequent players whose demand is Q_f = 260 - 0.4P and infrequent players whose demand is Q_i = 10 - 0.1P. The combined market demand is Q = 34 - 0.4P. The marginal cost and average total cost of providing a round of golf are $20. How much higher will the profit be if the golf course uses third-degree price discrimination instead of charging all golfers the same price?

A.	$0
B.	$7.50
C.	$10
D.	$110

Question 7: An airline sells seats on its flights to business travelers whose demand is Q_B = 300 - P and vacation travelers whose demand is Q_V = 150 - 0.5P. The combined market demand is Q = 450 - 1.5P. The marginal cost and average total cost of providing a seat on a flight are $200. How much higher will profit be if the airline uses third-degree price discrimination instead of charging all travelers the same price?

A.	$0
B.	$250
C.	$400
D.	$1,000

Question 8: If a firm practices third-degree price discrimination, the price charged should be higher in the market where demand is:

	A.	Higher.
	B.	Lower.
	C.	More price elastic.
	D.	Less price is elastic.

Question 9: The key difference between markets where third-degree price discrimination is possible and markets where second-degree price discrimination is possible is whether:

		A. resale is possible.
		B. customers have the same demand curves.
		C. firms have market power.
		D. firms can identify customers' demand before the customers make a purchase.

Question 10: For price discrimination via a quantity discount to work:

		A. customers who purchase larger quantities must have relatively elastic demand.
		B. customers who purchase larger quantities must have relatively inelastic demand.
		C. customers who pay a relatively high price must have relatively elastic demand.
		D. customers who pay a relatively low price must have relatively inelastic demand.

Question 11: A firm wants to offer a quantity discount to price-discriminate between buyers who are relatively uninterested in the product and buyers who are obsessively interested in it. The uninterested customers have a demand of Q_U = 30 - 0.5P. The package offered to them contains 10 units of the good at a price of $40 each. Which of the following packages designed for obsessed customers is incentive compatible?

	A.	60 units at a price of $10 each
	B.	40 units at a price of $10 each
	C.	60 units at a price of $20 each
	D.	40 units at a price of $20 each

Question 12: Which of the following conditions do not have to be met in order for indirect price discrimination by versioning to work?

		A.The firm's customers must have different demand curves.
		B. The marginal costs of producing each version of the product must be the same.
		C. The firm must be able to prevent resale.
		D. The firm must have market power.

	Willingness to pay (per month)
	Weight machines	Indoor pool
Abe	$60	$50
Betty	50	125
Chris	25	140

QUESTION 13
This table shows the willingness to pay off the only three potential customers of a firm that runs both a weight room and an indoor swimming pool. The weight room and pool each have a constant marginal cost of $20 per month. Which of the following pricing strategies yields the highest producer surplus?

		A. $60 for the weight room, $140 for the pool, or $175 for both
		B. $50 for the weight room, $125 for the pool, or $165 for both
		C. $25 for the weight room, $50 for the pool, or $70 for both
		D. $60 for the weight room, $130 for the pool, or $175 for both

Question 14: Which of the following features is needed to make bundling a possible price discrimination strategy but is not required for any other price discrimination strategies?

		A. Customers must have identical demand curves.
		B. The firm does not learn about customer demand until after purchase.
		C. Demand for two products must be negatively correlated.
		D. The firm must not have market power.

Question 15: Which of the following features is not needed for price discrimination using a two-part tariff to work?

		A. The firm must have market power.
		B. The firm must be able to prevent resale.
		C. The firm must learn about its customers' demands before purchases are made.
		D. The firm's customers must have different demand curves.

Question 16: A firm faces a market demand curve P = 50 - 5Q. It has a constant marginal cost of $10. Relative to standard monopoly pricing, how would a block pricing strategy where the first four units can be purchased for a price of $30 each, but two more units can be purchased for an additional $20 each change consumer surplus and producer surplus?

		A. Consumer surplus would decrease by $10, and producer surplus would increase by $20.
		B. Consumer surplus would increase by $10, and producer surplus would increase by $20.
		C. Consumer surplus would increase by $20, and producer surplus would increase by $10.
		D. Consumer surplus would increase by $20, and producer surplus would increase by $20.

Question 17: Relative to standard monopoly pricing, block pricing:

		A. decreases consumer surplus, increases producer surplus, and increases total surplus.
		B. increases consumer surplus, increases producer surplus, and increases total surplus.
		C. decreases consumer surplus, increases producer surplus, and decreases total surplus.
		D. decreases consumer surplus, decreases producer surplus, and decreases total surplus.

Question 18: Which of the following results in the highest amount of producer surplus?

	A.	bundling
	B.	third-degree price discrimination
	C.	block pricing
	D.	two-part tariffs

Question 19: Which of the following results in the highest amount of consumer surplus?

	A.	first-degree price discrimination
	B.	third-degree price discrimination
	C.	block pricing
	D.	two-part tariffs

Question 20: Which of the following results in the highest amount of total surplus?

	A.	third-degree price discrimination
	B.	block pricing
	C.	first-degree price discrimination
	D.	bundling

crimsonbadger400

Consider the following market game: An incumbent firm, called firm 3, is already in an industry. Two potential entrants, called firms 1 and 2, can each enter the industry by paying the entry cost of 10. First, firm 1 decides whether to enter or not. Then, after observing firm 1's choice, firm 2 decides whether to enter or not. Then, after observing firm 1's choice, firm 2 decides whether to enter or not. Every firm, including firm 3, observes the choices of firms 1 and 2. After this, all of the firms in the industry (including firm 3) compete in a Cournot oligopoly, where they simultaneously and independently select quantities. The price is determined by the inverse demand curve p = 12 â Q, where Q is the total quantity produced in the industry. Assume that the firms produce at no cost in this Cournot game. Thus, if firm i is in the industry and produces qi, then it earns a gross profit of (12 â Q)qi in the Cournot phase. (Remember that firms 1 and 2 have to pay the fixed cost of 10 to enter).

(a) Compute the subgame perfect equilibrium of this market game. Do so by first finding the equilibrium quantities and profit in the Cournot subgames. Show your answer by designating optimal action on the tree and writing the complete subgame perfect equilibrium strategy profile. [Hint: In an n-firm Cournot oligopoly with demand p = 12 â Q and 0 costs, the Nash equilibrium entails each firm producing the quantity q = 12/(n + 1).]

(b) In the subgame perfect equilibrium, which firms (if any) enter the industry?

silverantelope83

(Please show as much work as possible)

1. You are bidding in a second-price auction for a painting that you value at $800. You estimate that other bidders are most likely to value the painting at between $200 and $600. Which of these is likely to be your best bid?

a. $1,000

b. $800

c. $600

d. $400

2. Which of the following is true about different ways of conducting a private-value auction?

a. A first-price auction is strategically equivalent to a second-price auction.

b. A first-price auction is strategically equivalent to an English auction.

c. A second-price auction is strategically equivalent to an English auction.

d. None of the above

3. Suppose that five bidders with values of $500, $400, $300, $200, and $100 attend an oral auction. Which of these is closest to the winning price?

a. $500

b. $400

c. $300

d. $200

4. In the above auction, if the bidders with the first- and third-highest values ($500 and

$300) collude, which of these is closest to the winning price?

a. $500

b. $400

c. $300

d. $200

5. If a seller is concerned about collusion among bidders, which of the following changes to the auction, should the seller make?

a. Hold frequent, small auctions instead of infrequent large auctions.

b. Conceal the amount of winning bids.

c. Publically announce the name of each auction's winner.

d. Hold a second-price instead of a first-price auction.

6. You're holding an auction to license a new technology that your company has developed. One of your assistants raises a concern that bidders' fear of the winner's curse may encourage them to shade their bids. How might you address this concern?

a. Release your analyst's positive scenario for the technology's future profitability.

b. Release your analyst's negative scenario for the technology's future profitability.

c. Use an oral auction.

d. All of the above

7. In a first-price auction, you bid ________ your value, and in a second-price auction you bid _________ your value.

a. at; above

b. below; above

c. below; at

d. below; below

8. You hold an auction among three bidders. You estimate that each bidder has a value of either $16 or $20 for the item, and you attach probabilities to each value of 50%. What is the expected price? If two of the three bidders collude, what is the price?

9. In Sweden, firms that fail to meet their debt obligations are immediately auctioned off to the highest bidder. (There is no reorganization through Chapter 11 bankruptcy.) The current managers are often high bidders for the company. Why?

10. When a famous painting becomes available for sale, it is often known which museum or collector will be the likely winner. Yet, representatives of other museums that have no chance of winning are actively wooed by the auctioneer to attend anyway. Why?

11. The deities Mars and Venus often do battle to create the weather conditions on Earth. Venus prefers extreme temperatures (especially heat), while Mars prefers temperate conditions. The payoffs (expressed in Points of Wrath) are given below.

		Venus
		Warm	Chill
Mars	Warm	20 , 0	0 , 10
Chill	0 , 90	20 , 0

What is the unique mixed-strategy equilibrium of the above game?

(Let p be the probability of "Warm" for Mars, and q the probability of "Warm" for Venus.)

a) p=9/10, q=1/2

b) p=1/2, q=1/10

c) p=1/2, q=1/2

d) p=1/10, q=1/10

Player 2

		H	D
Player 1	H	0 , 0	4 , 1
D	1 , 4	2 , 2

12. The above game is the title of the hawk-dove game and used by evolutionary biologists to describe evolutionary processes. It is also used to model how a business should grow. In the above game, what is the Nash equilibrium in pure strategies and mixed strategies.?

Assume the cost of producing the goods is zero and that each consumer will purchase each good as long as the price is less than or equal to value. Consumer values are the entries in the table.

	Good 1	Good 2
Consumer A	$2,300	$1,700
Consumer B	$2,800	$1,200

13. Suppose the monopolist only sold the goods separately. What price will the monopolist charge for good 1 to maximize revenues for good 1?

a. $2,300

b. $2,800

c. $1,200

d. $1,700

14. What is the total profit to the monopolist from selling the goods separately?

a. $4,500

b. $6,300

c. $7,000

d. $6,000

15. What is a better pricing strategy for the monopolist? At this price, what are the total profits to the monopolist?

a. Bundle the goods at $2,800; Profits = $5,600

b. Bundle the goods at $4,000; Profits = $8,000

c. Charge $2,800 for good 1 and charge $1,700 for good 2; Profits = $4,500

d. Charging the lowest price for each good individually is the best pricing strategy; Profits = $7,000

16. The prisoners' dilemma is an example of

a. a sequential game.

b. a simultaneous game.

c.a shirking game.

d. a dating game

17. Nash equilibrium

a. is where one player maximizes his payoff, and the other doesn't.

b. is where each player maximizes his own payoff given the action of the other player.

c.is where both players are maximizing their total payoff.

d. is a unique prediction of the likely outcome of a game.

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ECON 710 Final: ECON 710 UW Madison Final Exam 2015a

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