PHIL 201 Chapter Notes - Chapter 4: Richard Swinburne, Moral Evil, Theodicy
SchoolUniversity of Calgary
Course CodePHIL 201
ProfessorC. Kenneth Waters
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April 1, 2019
Swinburne, Richard (1977) Problem of Evil: 2 part
THE PROBLEM OF EVIL TYPES
o evil of the first type physical evil,
o evil of the second type mental evil,
o evil of the third type state evil, and
o evil of the fourth type moral evil.
Since there is a clear contrast between evils of the first
three types, which are evils that happen to men or animals or the world and evils of the fourth
type, which are evils that men do, there is an advantage in having one name for evils of any of
the first three types-I shall call these passive evils.
1. God ought not to create evil doers
2. Against passive Evil
3. The quantity of the Evil
4. Passive Evil not due to human action
GOD OUGHT NOT TO CREATE EVIL DOERS
a) Now much of the evil in the world consists of the evil
actions of men and the passive evils brought about by those actions.
b) The free-will defense as stated needs a little filling out. For surely there could be fqee
agents who did not have the power of moral choice, agents whose only opportunities for
choice were between morally indifferent alternatives
AGAINST PASSIVE EVIL
o for supposing that the existence of moral evil is compatible with the existence of God. It
has not given grounds for supposing that the existence of evil consequences of moral
evils is compatible with the existence of God
o I do not find (P2) a very plausible moral principle. A world in which no one except the
agent was affected by his evil actions might be a world in which men had freedom but it
would not be a world in which men had responsibility.
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