PHIL1001 Lecture Notes - Lecture 9: Thought Experiment, Deontological Ethics
Agenda
The ethical problem posed to us by famine.
I.
Peter Singer's pro-famine relief argument.
II.
Objections & Singer's Replies.
III.
PART I
Common causes of famine:
Crop failure
•
Poverty
•
War
•
Economic policy
•
Where is famine occurring today?
Map
•
Extreme/Absolute Poverty
A person lives in extreme poverty if she has insufficient income to meet their
basic needs.
•
According to the World Bank:
The extreme poverty line is the equivalent of US$1.25 per day (what
will buy in the U.S.).
○
21% of people living in developing countries live in extreme poverty
(2010).
○
1.22 billion people (2010).
○
•
The Ethical Questions
Do each of us have a moral obligation to take steps to end or ameliorate
famine (or extreme poverty)?
•
If we do, how much is required of us?
•
Two Opposing Views
Peter Singer
We are under a strong and demanding moral obligation to send aid.
○
•
Neera Badhwar
We are not under a strong or demanding moral obligation to send aid.
○
•
PART II: Peter Singer
A thought experiment:
Shallow pond thought experiment.•
Baby is in pond - will drown if nothing is done.•
Lady is wearing expensive shoes which are strapped on so she cannot take
them off quickly; they will get damaged if she jumps in.
•
Q1: Would it be wrong not to save the child?
Q2: What makes it wrong?
The Prevention Principle
If its in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without
thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, then we
morally ought to do it.
•
Q3: Is this just act-utilitarianism?
No: compatible with deontological constraints.
No: does not require making the world maximally good or happy.
Singer's Main Argument
P1. If its in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby
sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, then we morally ought to do
it.
P2. Suffering and death from lack of food, shelter and medical care are bad.
P3. It is in our power to prevent some suffering and death from lack of food, etc.
without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance.
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C. We morally ought to prevent some suffering and death from lack of food, etc.
[whenever we can]
Question:
How much suffering must we prevent?
General Answer:
As much as possible, up to the point of sacrificing things of comparable moral
importance.
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"We ought to give until we reach the level of marginal utility - that is, the level at
which, by giving more, I would cause as much suffering to myself or my dependents
as I would relieve by my gift" -Singer (1972: 241)
PART III: Objections & Singer's Replies
Obj. 1: Famine sufferers are far away.
Reply 1: "We cannot discriminate because they are a bit far away" -Singer
Obj. 2: Other people who could help aren't helping; why should I?
Reply 2: If you know other people won't do anything to resolve the problem, then it
doesn't exempt you from helping.
Obj. 3: Property rights: people have a right to their justly-earned property.
Obj. 4: Foreign aid is the government's responsibility, not mine.
Obj.5: Overpopulation.
Lecture 10A Global Poverty and Famine
Monday, 7 May 2018
8:43 pm
Document Summary
The ethical problem posed to us by famine. A person lives in extreme poverty if she has insufficient income to meet their basic needs. The extreme poverty line is the equivalent of us. 25 per day (what will buy in the u. s. ). 21% of people living in developing countries live in extreme poverty (2010). We are under a strong and demanding moral obligation to send aid. We are not under a strong or demanding moral obligation to send aid. Baby is in pond - will drown if nothing is done. Lady is wearing expensive shoes which are strapped on so she cannot take them off quickly; they will get damaged if she jumps in. No: does not require making the world maximally good or happy. If its in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, then we morally ought to do it.
