POLS1005 Lecture Notes - Lecture 11: Common-Pool Resource, Overexploitation, Proven Reserves
POLS1005: LECTURE NOTES
[Lecture 11]
THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT
1. Why is global environmental cooperation so challenging?The collective action
problem: interactions, interests, and institutions;
Public goods & free riding; common-pool resources & overexploitation
THE COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM
Obstacles to cooperation that occur when actors have incentives to collaborate but each acts
in anticipation that others will pay the costs of cooperation - Frieden, Lake and Schultz,
2016, p.60
• Interactions: Multiple stakeholders interact to take advantage of a public good or a common-
pool resource
• Interests: Each stakeholder has an interest in maximum personal gain - but not in paying the
costs of collaboration
• Institutions: Institutions can mitigate collective action problems but only if members agree to
be constrained
Collective action problem #1 – Public goods & Free riding
What is a public good?
• Nonexcludable: once the good is available to one person, others cannot be excluded from
either suffering the cost or enjoying the benefits of that good
• Nonrival: the use or consumption of a public good by one person does not diminish the
quantity of the good available for use by others
What collective action problem is related to public goods?
• Free riding: to fail to contribute to a public good while benefiting from the contributions of
others
• Due to externalities: when a decision creates costs or benefits for stakeholders other than the
actor making the decision – can be both positive and negative
Collective action problem #2 – Common-pool resources & overexploitation
What is a common-pool resource?
• Nonexcludable but rival in consumption: difficult to exclude anyone from using a common-
pool resource, however one user’s consumption reduces the amount available for
consumption
What collective action problem is related to common-pool resources?
• Overexploitation: consumption of a good at a rate that is collectively undesirable, even if it
is efficient from the view of any single actor
• Common-pool resources & overexploitation often involves a trade-off between economic
gains (jobs and growth) and environmental conservation (e.g. logging, mining)
find more resources at oneclass.com
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POLS1005: LECTURE NOTES
WHY IS ACTION ON ENVIONRMENTAL ISSUES SO CHALLENGING?
Two sets of winners and losers
• Domestic level: polluting industries vs. concerned citizens
- Costs are concentrated – benefits are diffuse
• International level: Developing countries vs. developed countries
- Most of the carbon now warming up the atmosphere was emitted by developed
countries as they industrialized – so (developing countries argue) developed countries
ought to bear the costs of reducing future carbon emissions
2. Why does cooperation nevertheless (sometimes) succeed?
Increasing the chances for global cooperation: interests, interactions and institutions
• Successful cooperation on ozone layer depletion: Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs)
vs.
• Less successful cooperation on climate change
INCREASING THE CHANCES FOR COOPERATION
Interactions
• Number of actors: fewer actors - higher chance for cooperation
• Iteration: Repeated interactions - higher chance for cooperation
Interests
• Bundling goods: If public goods are bundled with private goods - "joint goods"
Market mechanisms to curb greenhouse gas emissions: cap-and-trade system (Emissions Trading Scheme)
• Privileged group: an actor or small group of actors receive sufficient benefits that they are
willing to bear the costs
International Institutions
• Set standards: establishing clear standards of behaviour to which states can be held
accountable. Framework conventions establish general principles that all states agree to
respect e.g., The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer
• Verify compliance: Time-consuming and challenging unless there is a complete ban on a
particular practices that is damaging to the environment: e.g., emitting CFCs; whaling.
• Facilitate discussion, decision-making, and dispute resolution
International agreements
• 1985: Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer
• 1989: Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 1992: United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC)
• 1997: Kyoto protocol2016: Paris Agreement (builds on the UNFCCC)
find more resources at oneclass.com
find more resources at oneclass.com
Document Summary
The collective action problem: interactions, interests, and institutions; Public goods & free riding; common-pool resources & overexploitation. Obstacles to cooperation that occur when actors have incentives to collaborate but each acts in anticipation that others will pay the costs of cooperation - frieden, lake and schultz, Interactions: multiple stakeholders interact to take advantage of a public good or a common- pool resource. Interests: each stakeholder has an interest in maximum personal gain - but not in paying the costs of collaboration. Institutions: institutions can mitigate collective action problems but only if members agree to be constrained. Collective action problem #1 public goods & free riding. Collective action problem #2 common-pool resources & overexploitation. What is a common-pool resource: nonexcludable but rival in consumption: difficult to exclude anyone from using a common- pool resource, however one user"s consumption reduces the amount available for consumption. Two sets of winners and losers: domestic level: polluting industries vs. concerned citizens.
