PHIL1003 Lecture Notes - Lecture 12: Type Physicalism, Afterimage, Mental Event
Mind-Brain Identity Theory
• Papineau writes:
o The causal argument tells us that each conscious property must
be identical with some physical property, but it doesnt tell us
which specific physical property any given conscious property
must be identical with. To establish any such specific property
identity, more detailed empirical information is needed 272
o The mind-brain identity theory draws upon such empirical
information to argue for specific identities between mental events
and brain events.
• The identity theory
o Pick any mental event call it M
o The theory says that there is some P, a physical event, and M = P
o E.g. pain might be certain neurons firing, c-neurons, (P), and being
in pain is just a case of whether or not these neurons are firing.
Therefore the experience of pain (M) is not merely correlated by
these neurons firing but is identical to it.
• Two meanings, one event
o We have two ways of thinking about the one thing
o Objection 7: ) can imagine myself turned to stone and yet having
images, aches, pains, and so on [therefore mental states are not
brain states]
▪ The objection shows that experience and brain process do
not have the same meaning. It does not show that an
experience is not in face a brain process. [Smart Sensations
and Brain Processes]
• Privacy
o A hallmark of mental events is that they are private
▪ Only ) really know whether or not ) am in pain and ) cannot
be wrong about it
o According to the )dentity Theory this is only because we havent
learnt our neuroscience yet
▪ One day well be able to tell from what a brain is doing
whether or not a person is really in pain
• Against the Identity Theory
o Imagine staring at a bright light for a while and the closing your
eyes. Youll get an after-image – lets say its yellow
▪ Then youre having a yellow visual experience
▪ But its not true that any of your brain states are yellow
▪ Your experience is the neurological vehicle through which
the content – that of a yellow afterimage – is represented.
The experience isnt itself yellow; it carries information that
represents a yellow afterimage
o Suppose ET experienced pain, would you say he was capable of
feeling pain?
▪ Maybe his pain is experienced in a different way to ours
• When he feels pain his c-neurons do not fire
• He may not even have a brain mass like us
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