PHIL 1301 Lecture Notes - Lecture 7: Qualia, Color Vision, Consciousness

• School: Carleton University
• Department: Philosophy
• Course: PHIL 1301
• Professor: karinavold

Document Summary

P1: if 2 thing are numerically identical they are 1 in the same thing. P2: one could be in pain and not have c fibres. C: therefore pain cannot be numerically identical to c fiber firings. One and the same mental type can be implemented by different lower level physical types. Every mental type (property or state) is numerically identical with material neurobiological type (property or state) Reductive: science of the mind is just a science of the brain. Phenomenal consciousness: (cid:449)he(cid:374) there is (cid:862)so(cid:373)ethi(cid:374)g it is like(cid:863) to (cid:271)e ha(cid:448)i(cid:374)g a(cid:374) e(cid:454)perie(cid:374)(cid:272)e. Qualia: the subjective inner components of our phenomenally conscious experiences. Tho(cid:373)as nagel (cid:862)what is it like to (cid:271)e a (cid:271)at(cid:863) Consciousness is essentially subjective and bound to the first person perspective. But scientific inquiry assumes an objective sta(cid:374)dpoi(cid:374)t, the so (cid:272)alled (cid:862)(cid:448)ie(cid:449) fro(cid:373) (cid:374)o(cid:449)here(cid:863) There is no reason to suppose that it is subjectively like anything we can explain or imagine.