PHIL 1301 Lecture Notes - Lecture 9: Hilary Putnam, Reductionism, Color Blindness
2 Mar 2017
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Reductivism view of mind-brain identity (brain is the mind) Non-reductionism closer to multiple realizabilities (perhaps mental states are material states, but cannot only be reduced to this) C: bats have a very different conscious experiences from ours (cid:894)(cid:449)e(cid:859)ll (cid:374)e(cid:448)er k(cid:374)o(cid:449) (cid:449)hat it(cid:859)s like to (cid:271)e a bat) P1: if reductive materialism is true, we ought to be able to give an objective account of conscious experience. P3: reductive materialism seems unable to accommodate or account for purely subjective phenomena. C: reductive materialism is not correct: frank jackson (cid:862)what mary didn"t know(cid:863) Mary in black and white room, everything in black and white, but she studies colour (wavelengths, colour perception, etc. ) Jackson"s view: it seems obvious she will learn something about the world, but she already had all of the physical information. So there is more to have than that, so physicalism (or reductive materialism is false) P1: mary knows all the physical facts about colour vision.
