ECON 203 Lecture Notes - Lecture 13: Overnight Rate, Openmarket, Foreign Exchange Market

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byzantiumzebra936

15 Nov 2016

School

University of Calgary

Department

Economics

Course

ECON 203

Professor

Aamir Hashmi

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ECON 203 Full Course Notes

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Capital requirement: a government regulation that specifies a minimum amount of capital, intended to ensure that banks will be able to pay off depositors and debts. Leverage and the financial crisis: in the financial crisis of 2008, banks suffered losses on mortgage loans and mortgage-backed securities due to widespread defaults. Many banks become insolvent (unable to repay debts), and others found themselves with too little capital, responded by reducing lending, leading to a credit crunch. To ease the credit crunch, the federal reserve and us treasury injected hundreds of billions dollars worth of capital into the banking system. This policy temporarily made taxpayers part-owners of many banks. Central banks have 3 main tools for monetary control: open-market operations. Central bank either sells or buys bonds to commercial banks. Buying is expansionary and selling is contractionary: changes in reserve requirements. Asking banks to keep a certain amount in reserves, so they will have hard cash readily available.

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Please read this article. It discusses foreign currency issues for the Euro. Please elaborate and explain your thoughts on the article below.

The wisdom in the eurozone is that if the European Central Bank would only follow the lead of the Federal Reserve and move to far more aggressive monetary policy, which it is now doing, all will be hunky-dory.
Of course, drenching the single currency area in euros will help, and make it easier for banks to lend again.
It is also a brave act for the ECBâs Italian president, Mario Draghi. His promise to expand the balance sheet of the ECB by â¬1trillion flies in the face of historic German concerns about overexuberant monetary policy and the horrors of the Weimar Republic.
The bigger question, however, is whether the source of the eurozoneâs problems is simply a lack of credit, or is it more deeply rooted?
Many euroland economies simply are loaded down with too much debt. The âtroikaâ solution offered by the IMF, European Commission and ECB to this has been austerity. But still the debt levels rise.
Even the IMFâs own internal monitoring group has questioned the wisdom of the policy. The traditional solution for countries in trouble are the double âDâ approach â devaluation and default. The first is impossible in a single currency area unless nations drop out, as happened in 1993 when the euro predecessor, the European Monetary System, fell-apart.
That leaves the eurozone with default. It sound horrible and irresponsible, but as Harvardâs Benjamin Friedman recently observed, the debt of the 18 countries in the single currency region is more akin to American municipal bonds, rather than national debt. And managed defaults of American state and city debt have long been a feature of the landscape.
Official Greek debt could, for instance, be restructured so that payments could be stretched out over far longer time horizons and the coupons paid slashed. This was how the Latin American debt crisis in the 1980s, and some of the problems in East Asia a decade later, were fixed.
Standing in the way of such radical answers is Germany with its economic absolutes. Sometimes, however, German leaders choose to forget the fiscal history that they want to bury. In the 1930s it essentially defaulted on debts built up in the First World War and as a result of reparations.
At the London Debt Conference in 1953, the amount of debt Germany built up before, during and after the Second World War was halved and payment of principal suspended for five years and drawn out over 30 years to give a recovering and rebuilding economy breathing space.
That is the kind of precedent that Germany should be looking at now instead of insisting on hardship among its neighbours. It could also refrain from winding up friends by discouraging Brussels from presenting the UK with bills for Â£1.7billion in the knowledge that it would be a huge political embarrassment.
It is only by sleight of hand that the invoice has been halved.
Peace talk
The notion that Standard Charteredâs woes stem from the fact it was unfairly targeted by New York regulators is poppycock. The 29 per cent decline in the bankâs share price this year is representative of a much deeper malaise.
So far Standard Chartered has paid Â£400million in fines, in two tranches, to US enforcers, the most recent for failing to fix problems first identified in 2012: not smart.
Badly treated? Not if compared to BNP Paribas that had to stump up Â£5.5billion. As for the idea that foreign banks have been singled out â that also is ill-informed. Fines levied on JP Morgan Chase and Bank of America Merrill Lynch have been in the tens of billions of pounds.
One person who is certainly not taking Standard Charteredâs sliding reputation for granted is chairman Sir John Peace. He admitted to investors in Singapore, home to its largest shareholder Temasek with 17.7 per cent, that it was too complex and âtoo bureaucraticâ and takes too long to make decisions.
One critical action still pending is the removal of chief executive Peter Sands, who sought to brush aside charges of Iranian sanctions-busting and now has presided over a series of profits warnings. Temasek this week expressed its unanimous support for âPeter and Johnâ. Football fans will recognise the significance of that.
Slow coach
No one can question the determination of the Financial Conduct Authority to punish market offenders. But the speed at which it and the British courts deliver financial justice is farcical.
Julian Rifat, of hedge fund Moore Capital, was arrested on insider trading charges in 2010 but it was only yesterday that he was convicted of a Â£250,000 conspiracy as part of the Tabernula investigation involving six others.
Now we have another two month wait for sentencing.
The FCA says the probe was âpainstakingâ but that is no excuse for a lethargic process.

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ECON 203 Lecture Notes - Lecture 13: Overnight Rate, Openmarket, Foreign Exchange Market

ECON 203 Full Course Notes

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