Cogito Ergo Sum
Descartes begins Meditation II with a review of position to which he has been led.
Then he asks a new question:
... am not I at least something?
But I have just said that I have no senses and no body. This s i the sticking
point: what follows from this? Am I not so bound up with a body and with
senses that I cannot exist without them?
But I have convinced myself that there is absolutely nothing in the world,
no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies. Does it now follow tha I tt oo do not
exist? No: if I convinced myself of something then I certainly existed.
But there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who l ib eeately
and constantly deceiving me. In that case I too undoubtedly exist, if he is
deceiving me; and let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never
bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something. His arg