PHIL 111 Lecture Notes - Lecture 2: Norman Kemp Smith, Presupposition, Practical Reason
The Political Philosophy of Kant Session 4 April 13, 1967
77
nothing but a world of phenomena
xxiii
, we must assume that moral world
to be a consequence of our conduct in the world of sense (in which no
such connection between worthiness and happiness is exhibited), and
therefore to be for us a future world. Thus God and a future life are two
postulates which, according to the principles of pure reason, are
inseparable from the obligation which that same reason imposes upon
us.
xxiv
LS: Ya. he couldn’t express himself more strongly. In other words, if there is a moral
law, then we are compelled to hope
50
that God exists and that there is a future life. So
Kant really does what Rousseau was aiming at in the Profession of Faith,
51
[of] which I
spoke in the first meeting, namely, to find a metaphysical teaching which would be
strictly related to morality and nothing else. So what Rousseau, or his person, the
Savoyard Vicar, tried to do but failed to do, Kant succeeds in doing it, at least much
better. Yes. Now is there any difficulty? Kant
52
uses even stronger language.
53
Let us
read the next paragraph.
Mr. Reinken:
Morality, by itself, constitutes a system. Happiness, however, does not do so, save
in so far as it is distributed in exact proportion to morality.
xxv
LS: Now that happiness is not a system is a somewhat scholastic way of saying it
54
does
not have an order of preference, you know? And therefore it cannot be an ideal of reason;
it can only be an ideal of the imagination, as Kant puts it elsewhere. And therefore
happiness cannot be the standard; only morality can be the standard—but morality calls,
or cries, for a harmony between morality and happiness. Yes, go on.
Mr. Reinken:
But this is possible only in the intelligible world, under a wise Author and Ruler.
Such a Ruler, together with life in such a world, which we must regard as a future
world, reason finds itself constrained to assume; otherwise it would have to regard
the moral laws as empty figments of the brain, since without this postulate the
necessary consequence which it itself connects with these laws—
xxvi
LS: Who says, “postulate”?
Mr. Reinken: Norman Kemp Smith.
LS: Ya, not Kant. [Laughter] Kant later on speaks of postulates of pure
reason . . . practical reason, but he doesn’t call them here in the Critique of Pure Reason,
since the necessary effect of the saying—
xxiii
In original: “appearances”
xxiv
Ibid., B838-839.
xxv
Ibid., B839.
xxvi
Ibid.
The Political Philosophy of Kant Session 4 April 13, 1967
78
Mr. Reinken: Would not follow.
LS: Which the same reason connects with them would not follow without that
presupposition. Now postulate and presupposition are not the same thing. It is a very
strong statement. Morality becomes an empty thing. How does Brutus say in Julius
Caesar about virtue after the loss of the Battle of Philippi? Virtue: A shadow, a dream:
but for God and the future life. Yes. Go on, read this; finish this paragraph.
Mr. Reinken:
Hence also everyone regards the moral laws as commands; and this the moral
laws could not be if they did not connect a priori suitable consequences with their
rules, and thus carry with them promises and threats. But this again they could not
do, if they did not reside in a necessary being, as the supreme good, which alone
can make such a purposive unity possible.
xxvii
LS: Yes. Now, Mr. Londow?
Mr. Londow: Oh, yes. At the beginning of section [B]838
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there’s a suggestion that if
everyone acted according to the moral law, in other words, if there were a society in
which not only one individual acted justly, but everyone acted justly, then there would be
no possibility of your being treated unjustly. And so the demands of the Gorgias would
be fulfilled, and morality in that sense, if there were a perfect society, would be
self-rewarding. And if that is a possibility, then it would seem that God and a future life
are no longer—
LS: Yes!
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I am glad, happy that you bring that up. What would this be in theological
language, but also in Kant’s language? Yes?
Mr. Londow: That’s . . . that’s outside of our life.
LS: Pardon?
Mr. Londow: That’s Heaven,
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that can’t be in our life.
Student: The City of God.
LS: Ya. No: the realm of God on earth,
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sure! That was exactly the point which later on
was the objection of some people in the nineteenth century—the communists especially,
but not only them; to some extent Hegel. I mean, the successors of Kant attacked him on
the ground that he wanted to have a reward,
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or for that matter the punishment, the
harmony which can reasonably be expected between acting justly and not suffering
injustice, can be brought about by an improved social-political life.
60
And Kant is very
much concerned with this earthly condition, otherwise he would not have written the
Perpetual Peace and other things. But all the more urgent becomes the question: What
kept Kant back from the seemingly obvious solution to the problem? What was it?
xxvii
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B839-840.
Document Summary
Thus god and a future life are two postulates which, according to the principles of pure reason, are inseparable from the obligation which that same reason imposes upon us. xxiv. Ls: ya. he couldn"t express himself more strongly. In other words, if there is a moral law, then we are compelled to hope50 that god exists and that there is a future life. Kant really does what rousseau was aiming at in the profession of faith,51 [of] which i spoke in the first meeting, namely, to find a metaphysical teaching which would be strictly related to morality and nothing else. Savoyard vicar, tried to do but failed to do, kant succeeds in doing it, at least much better. Kant52 uses even stronger language. 53 let us read the next paragraph. Happiness, however, does not do so, save in so far as it is distributed in exact proportion to morality. xxv.
