A Theory of War (Bargaining II)

53 views5 pages
19 Mar 2014
School
Course
Professor
A Theory of War & Peace 02/13/2014
Bargaining Model of War Part II
War is costly & because of that we get this range of deals that both sides prefer to war (bargaining range)
Bargaining failures arise from:
Incomplete Information about resolve or capabilities and an incentive to misrepresent
Problems of credible commitment
Indivisibilities
Not a separate cause, but part of commitment problems
“I know something you don’t know…” a.k.a Incomplete Information
Uncertainty about model parameters
Probability of victory (p)
Costs of fighting (i.e. resolve) (a or b)
Resolve: willingness to endure costs in order to gain/keep something you desire (often referred to as
cost)
More resolve = war is less costly & vice versa
Information Problem: Different Beliefs
(On PowerPoint)
Information Problem: Mutual Optimism
(On PowerPoint)
Problem: Incentives to Misrepresent
Why not reveal information? (If it gets you better deals, you are not going to give up that information & even
if states do try to signal information through actions, other state might still believe they are lying)
Because states possess incentives to misrepresent/bluff:
Signaling resolve
Risk-return tradeoff (Brinksmanship)
You’re risking conflict but there is the potential that you get a better payoff through that risk
Unlock document

This preview shows pages 1-2 of the document.
Unlock all 5 pages and 3 million more documents.

Already have an account? Log in
Brinksmanship: The “Slippery Slope”
State’s could signal resolve by approaching the “brink” of war through provocative actions
Which is a fancy way of saying that states can, and do, bluff
But, what’s the potential problem?
^^ Somebody calls your bluff & you end up in a situation you didn’t want to be in
Costly Signals
This language of coercion deals with how to signal resolve
Costly Signals:
Brinksmanship or risk
Tying hands: increasing the costs of “backing down”
Must be costly (ex: mobilizing troops and sending them over borders)
If actions and statements are not costly, called cheap talk
Can’t find the bargaining range if you’re operating with different sets of
information
Example of WWI/Iraq War & Incomplete Information (On PowerPoint)
Bargaining failures can occur due to commitment problems…
Commitment problems arise when states cannot credibly promise not to use force
Promises are credible only when it is in the self-interest of actors to carry them out
Commitment problem is a time-inconsistency problem (prime difference between commitment problem &
incomplete information)
Shifts in Military Power as Mechanism Generating a Commitment Prob.
Preventive War
Power is changing exogenously
First-strike Advantage
U.S developing a missile defense system
Russian response?
Issues that affect future bargaining power
Golan Heights (Important for Israel strategically & if they were to ever give back to Syria, they would see
themselves in a weaker bargaining area)
Unlock document

This preview shows pages 1-2 of the document.
Unlock all 5 pages and 3 million more documents.

Already have an account? Log in

Get access

Grade+
$10 USD/m
Billed $120 USD annually
Homework Help
Class Notes
Textbook Notes
40 Verified Answers
Study Guides
1 Booster Class
Class+
$8 USD/m
Billed $96 USD annually
Homework Help
Class Notes
Textbook Notes
30 Verified Answers
Study Guides
1 Booster Class