POLI 211 Lecture Notes - Kim Jong-Un, Preventive War, Precondition
Commitent problems
Credible comitment prob - comes from fear that opponent will cheat on
you
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Sources of commitment problems
Bargaining over goods == source of fut bargaining power (strategically
important)
Ex: Senkaku islands in South China Sea
If you claim land in South China Sea, you can use for trade and
control strategic terr use for rather than cede it as
international territories
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Ex: Golan Heights bw Syria and Israel
Syria used it to spy on Israel
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So Israel occupied it
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Weapons programs (WMD)
Ex: N. Korea VS US
If NK agrees 2 dismantle program, they lose major bargaining
power
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The US would have to credibly commit to not exploit NK's loss
in bargaining power (kicking out Kim Jong UN)
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Commitment issue is with US cuz they might exploit NK
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Dif. Rates of economic growth and new tech
Econ growth / new tech can later be converted to mil strength,
which would increase barganing power in future
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Commitment problem is with state that with economic growth /
new tech
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=> other state may do preventive war to prevent other from
becoming stronger
Precondition: state needs to believe it'll slow down / prevent
other state's economic growth
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First strike advantage
The two cases where each state attacks first changes the bargaining
range significantly
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S.T. there may be 0 overlap bw the two bargaining ranges, and
bargaining is impossible
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L 9.12 Commitment Problems
Wednesday, September 12, 2018
11:18 AM
