POLI 211 Lecture Notes - Democratic Peace Theory, Collective Action, Sunk Costs
POLI 211 Exam Review Sheet
Study chapters 2, 3, 4, 5 (only the part on alliances, disregard collective security), and
6. Pay particular (but not exclusive) attention to:
The rational choice framework (every aspect)
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The bargaining model and causes of interstate war (every aspect)
Information problems
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Commitment problems
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Issue indivisibility
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Techniques for making credible commitments (including credible threats),
audience costs, sunk costs, tying hands etc.
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Democratic peace theory (every aspect)
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How domestic politics influences foreign policy and interstate bargaining
(including role of leaders, bureaucracy, military, special interest groups and the
public)
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The prisoner’s dilemma and collective action problems
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Alliances (causes and consequences)
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The causes of civil war
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Civil war as a bargaining failure and how to prevent civil war
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Causes of terrorism
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The strategies of terrorism (all of them)
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Democratic peace theory
Democratic peace THESIS is that democratic states rarely go to war with
each other
Fact is also that they are as war-prone as autocratic countries
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Democratic peace THEORY(IES) are potential explanations
Institutions argument:
Democratic instiuttions like elections constrain leaders from
going to war
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More transparency, and therefore less misinformation
Freedom of press, public info, etc => they can see
resolve, willingness to go to war, capabilities
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Normative Peace Theory
Because of shared values, their preferred outcomes and costs
are often shared and similar
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Capitalist peace theory
Because of trade and interdependence, democratic countries,
which tend to be wealthy, benefit from trade and peace
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How domestic politics impact foreign policy
Audience costs: when leader makes a threat or promise, there are costs if
they don't follow through
Since the costs exists in dem states where they're held accountable
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If opposition party opposes or support's leader's stance, leader has
less or more credibility respectively to follow through on their
actions
If party opposes or supports, leader is less or more likely to
follow through respectively
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Incentives to war for special interests: lobbyists for corporations (ex
weapons manufacturers) or ethnic groups may lobby for war
Even though there's an overall greater cost imposed on us, the
individual costs are quite small
And we have a collective action problem - incentive to
freeride
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But for the small interest groups, the indivudal benefits are quite
large
And because they're small, it's easier to organize around a
cause
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Diversionary incentive/theory for war
Leaders with low levels of support and/or when economy is
struggling are incentivized to go to war
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The effect of getting national support is: Rally round the flag effect
People become more united, nationalistic when there's an
external threat
Opposition silences the critics within itself
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War drives domestic issues out of headlines
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Scapegoating
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Collective action problems
Situation in which there's a defined group of actors
With similar interests in an outcome
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Where in order to reach that outcome, a certain # of members need
to pay some cost
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But if that set of members pays that cost, then the group receives
the outcome
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And some members can get away without paying that outcome,
thereby free-riding
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Example:
Paris Climate Change, countries incentivized to freeload to not
impact economy
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Most likely be asked what it is, and to give an example
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Causes of alliances
Shared interests in economic ties, interests, and in establishing interests
at all
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Main cause is mutual interest in security
Often, shared opponent
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Stronger states sometimes provide alliances in order to influence
weaker states
Weaker states give up some autonomy to benefit from
protection
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Consequences of allianes
If states form blocs, and blocs become equally balanced, then war
could be more likely
Could also be less likely tbh□
Ex: Cold War had 2 blocs and □
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Credibility control tradeoff
The stronger commitment, the more credible the commtment is
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=> the less control C has on A
A will be more belligerent□
To make alliance credible, C finds itself entrapped and A finds
itself belligerent
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Solution? Add flexibility
Ex: in NATO, it's up to members to decide whether they
wanna attack or not
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Bargaining range of model
Bargaing range is determined by cost of war
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Costs are relative and depend on:
Willingness to go to war (resolve), and ability to win and fight
(capabilities)
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Causes of war
Indivisibility
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Misinformation (current terms)
Opponent's capabilities□
Is opponent as resolved as they say□
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Commitment problems (future terms)
When 2 states are in dispute, neither can credibly commit to
not breaking the deal
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If over territory, any gain in territory lets one side get stronger
and take over more control in the future
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Ex: if weak state is gonna economically develop and get
stronger, weak state has the credibility issue
Cuz strong state isn't sure that weak state won't invade
strong state later on
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Prisoner's dilemma
2 players can benefit from cooperation
But in each player's ideal model, they'd defect and the other would
cooperate, so defecting is to be expected from both
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D10.4 review
Thursday, October 4, 2018
2:37 PM
