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IR 2.24.docx

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Department
Political Science
Course
PS-0061
Professor
Kelly Greenhill
Semester
Spring

Description
IR 2.24 Tragic Causes of War: Deterrence, Compellence, and Security Dilemma: • Evil Tradition: ultimate cause of war lies in human nature and the aspirations of individual states; most conflicts arise because of incompatible interests, not unintended consequences; humans are naturally conceited and corrupted (Leviathan); imperialistic, revolutionary, revisionist; all human beings want power over others • Tragic Tradition: root cause of conflict lies in the international system; stresses role of uncertainty and unintended consequences; tends to downplay the role of the individual and state characteristics and emphasize the role of anarchy and the distribution of power among states; states are ultimately victims of their environment • purposes of force: Type Purpose Mode Targets Defensive Fend off attacks and/or Peaceful and physical Primarily military; reduce damage secondarily industrial Deterrent Prevent adversary from Peaceful Primarily civilian; taking an action tertiarily military Compellent Persuade an adversary to Peaceful and physical All three with no clear start or stop doing ranking (civilian, something industrial, military) Swaggering Enhance prestige Peaceful none • deterrence o use of threats and other measures to dissuade a party from using (military) force or other instruments of persuasion to pursue foreign policy goals o focus on affecting future behavior o ex: presence of US troops along DMZ in Korean peninsula • compellence o the use of threats and other measures (often military) to persuade a party to cease using (military) force or other instruments of persuasion to pursue foreign policy goals o focus is on affecting current behavior o ex: NATO action against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia against their cleansing of Albanians Action Potential payoff Risk Prescription Attempted deterrence Deterrence works: no Spiral model Carrots better than sticks via escalation (similar towar results Backfires: leads to balancing) spiral, arms races, heightened tensions and war Attempted de-escalation Appeasement works; no Deterrence Model Sticks better than carrots via appeasement war results Fails: whets appetite of aggressor, so no one gets not only a war, but a war against stronger adversary • Fearon: “As long as both sides suffer some costs for fighting, then war is always inefficient—both sides would have been better off if they could have achieved the same final resolution _____ o private information  disagreements about relative power  miscalculation of willingness to fight  misrepresentation in bargaining o commitment problems  preemptive war & offensive advantage  preventive war & commitment problems  commitment, strategic territory, and the problem of appeasement  promises made today can’t be guaranteed tomorrow; trust o lumpiness; indivisibility  no bargain can be reached; can’t split the baby o key issues: uncertainty and relative gains
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