POL S 7 Lecture Notes - Lecture 3: Stag Hunt, World Trade Organization, Security Dilemma
RECAP
Interests
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Interactions
Bargaining - expense of another actor
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Cooperation - everyone benefits
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Institutions
Regime: tangible, UN, WTO
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Concepts: norms
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Chapter 3: War is so costly, why war?
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Enlarging the pie, but at the end of the day, you still have to divide the pie
Start off cooperative, but end up having to bargain
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Bargaining: someone is sacrificing more than the other and thus being worse off
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Why do states comply with international agreements?
Develop relations with other countries
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Better reputation
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Which issue areas do you see high and low levels of compliance?
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QUIZ #1
Which of the following games is a problem of collaboration?
Prisoners dilemma
a.
Chicken
b.
Stag hunt - coordination; everyone has incentive to cooperate - coordination; no
incentive to defect
c.
All of the above
d.
1)
What is the Peace of Westphalia?
Treaties signed by European states after the Thirty Year's war establishing nation-
states
a.
2)
How can institutions help create cooperation
Reduce transaction costs
a.
Set standards of behavior
b.
Verify compliance
c.
All of the above
d.
3)
Section 3
Tuesday, April 16, 2019
11:58 AM
f
n-
All of the above
d.
Definition of security dilemma?
An attempt to increase one's own security leads to others' insecurity
a.
4)
True or False?: Compellance is an effort to change status quo through the threat of force,
while deterrence is an effort to preserve the status quo though the threat of force.
TRUE
a.
5)
NOTES
War is rare
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War is costly
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Countries should be able to negotiate and settle differences instead of going to war
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Why does war still occur?
Bargaining failure
Incomplete information - cannot make rational decision
Arises in crisis bargaining when states cannot readily observe
adversaries' capabilities and values for war
Capabilities: state's physical ability to prevail in war
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Resolve: the willingness of a state to endure the cost of war
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What kind of data should we look for to estimate capabilities and
resolve?
Capability: size of army, arsenal of weapons, military spending,
manpower, country's economic situation
This information is readily available if a country is part of an
international organization
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Resolve: harder to estimate
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Problem of credible commitment - can't trust agreements between opponents
Somewhat linked to incomplete information in trusting enemy
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How much can we trust our enemy and their information?
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Commitment problems arise when states cannot credibly promise not
to use force especially when:
Bargaining over issues that affect future power
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Power is changing exogenously
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There are first strike advantages - likelihood of winning
Preventive vs. preemptive war
Preemptive: when threat is perceived to be eminent
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Preventive: waged when the threat is real but farther
away
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States have incentives to misrepresent/bluff
They tend to make threats so their enemies don’t want to fight
them
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