POL S 7 Lecture Notes - Lecture 7: Moral Hazard
Document Summary
Augment the power of member states, deterring challenges. Increase the costs of war, expanding the bargaining range. Create new information asymmetries, leading to new bargaining failures. Bargaining between three states: a and c ally against b. B has an incentive to challenge a because likely outcomes in b"s favor. If a is augmented by c, likely outcome is shifted in a and c"s favor. Under conditions of uncertainty, a and b can have the same potential for bargaining failures as in two-party conflicts. In addition, c has private information about its willingness to come to a"s aid. A and b may have different estimates of c"s reliability. If b believes c is unreliable, will demand (cid:522)too much. (cid:523) If a believes c is reliable, will refuse b"s demand. Germany and italy publicly enter the (cid:518)pact of steel,(cid:519) 1939. Seen as a sign of weakness, because both parties should not have to sign a document.
