POLI 142K Lecture Notes - Lecture 15: Rational Expectations, Informationweek
Document Summary
War and the institutional problem of strategic information. Strategic information: information that shapes and is shaped by strategy (war or peace) Information can be low or high value (content) Low value information is incomplete, irrelevant, or false. Much diplomatic dialogue is low value (intended for domestic audience) In general, transparency (full disclosure of preferences, capabilities) is preferable to low value signaling. Low value information (bluffing, cheap talk, deception) is a) costly b) likely to be revealed (intelligence) c) self-defeating signaling power that does not exist can trigger retaliation (iraq 2003) C. information signaling is critical for deterrence and compellence . Deterrence can be automatic and self-enforcing a) balance of power (5 = 5) b) no war choice could possibly yield benefits greater than costs. Active deterrence (or compellence ) requires signaling credible threats and or bribes to deter adversary"s likely behavior (aggression) or compel change in behavior (relinquish expansion) a) balance of power is passive or automatic.
