POL 1025 Lecture Notes - Lecture 12: Conventional Warfare, Plutonium, Contiguity
Document Summary
Should we worry much about preventing the spread of nuclear weapons: the logic of deterrence. Different from prisoner"s dilemma dc > cc > dd > cd. The balance of interests (not the balance of power) The nuclear revolution: do nuclear weapons differ from conventional weapons: destructiveness, long-term effects, speed. The logic of nuclear deterrence: the absolute weapon , mad: mutual assured destruction, secure retaliatory (second-strike) force, mutual vulnerability yields stability unrestrained offense is the best defense, defense is offense the threat of missile defense. The problem: motivation: states may want nuclear weapons badly, knowledge of basic nuclear technology = widespread. The hope: control of fissile materials: very expensive, hard to enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium on a large scale without getting caught, reasons for concern, a. q. Khan"s proliferation network: lack of security of fissile materials in fsu, civilian research reactors.
