POLI SCI 348 Lecture Notes - Lecture 3: Nuclear Warfare, Rationality, Level Of Measurement
7 Jan 2019
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Document Summary
Repetition: games can either occur once or can be repeated. Ir examples: nuclear war- one time occurrence, tariffs: multiple occurrence. Repeated: abiding by an international law: most ir interactions occur over time. Information: players may not know everything that is going on or may not have all the information to solve the game. Most games have uncertainties; we distinguish the types of uncertainties. Imperfection: players don"t know important physical aspect that may affect the game, ie the weather. No player knows more than the other though: players are unaware of actions chosen by the other player. Fixed or manipulated rules: this involves whether the players must follow existing rules or can make up their own rules. In class our focus would be on fixed rules. In the long run/ the real world rules change. Enforcement: external enforcement helps with cooperation; it can increase the range of mutually beneficial deals. But 3rd parties (neutrals) enforcement of agreement is rare in ir.
