Hi Tina. Thanks so much for starting our discussion this week!You brought up a great point about independence. In order for anaudit opinion to be reliable, it must be issued by an âindependentâaccounting firm. The increased independence requirement of SOX tookaway huge amounts of revenue from the public accounting firms.However, I think most of them have probably been able to make upmost of those lost revenues through the additional work they dorelated to SOX compliance. Prior to SOX, many public accountingfirms were earning more money from their audit clients doingconsulting work than they were earning for the audit fees (ArthurAndersen and Enron are a great example of this!). When the auditorsare doing consulting work, it can create somewhat of a gray linebetween the auditors and management. It also makes it extremelydifficult (if not impossible) for the auditor to remain objective.Subsequent to SOX, the audit firms had to stop performing theseconsulting services for their audit clients (or relinquish theirduties as the auditor for that company). They can do one or theother, but not both. Class, do you think it's possible for anauditor to be completely independent from their client? Why or whynot?
Hi Tina. Thanks so much for starting our discussion this week!You brought up a great point about independence. In order for anaudit opinion to be reliable, it must be issued by an âindependentâaccounting firm. The increased independence requirement of SOX tookaway huge amounts of revenue from the public accounting firms.However, I think most of them have probably been able to make upmost of those lost revenues through the additional work they dorelated to SOX compliance. Prior to SOX, many public accountingfirms were earning more money from their audit clients doingconsulting work than they were earning for the audit fees (ArthurAndersen and Enron are a great example of this!). When the auditorsare doing consulting work, it can create somewhat of a gray linebetween the auditors and management. It also makes it extremelydifficult (if not impossible) for the auditor to remain objective.Subsequent to SOX, the audit firms had to stop performing theseconsulting services for their audit clients (or relinquish theirduties as the auditor for that company). They can do one or theother, but not both. Class, do you think it's possible for anauditor to be completely independent from their client? Why or whynot?
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Required: After reading the Bye, Bye SOX? Article comment on the issue of small business compliance with Section 404 of SOX
Bye, Bye, SOX? | |
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) | SOX compliance has been extended |
may be declawed by upcoming | four times, but they wonât need to |
U.S. Congress and | comply at all if the Garrett-Adler |
Supreme Court decisions. | amendment makes it to the Senate |
The House of Representatives | floor as a standalone bill. |
recently voted to approve the | SOX also established the |
Garrett-Adler amendment, which | PCAOB to oversee and regulate |
would exempt small companies | audit firms. PCAOB operates under |
from SOX Section 404 provisions, | the supervision of the Securities |
while the Supreme Court is considering | and Exchange Commission (SEC), |
the constitutionality of the | which also appoints PCAOB members. |
Public Company Accounting Oversight | It is funded by fees charged to |
Board (PCAOB). | audited firms. When it was established, |
These developments may have | Congress wanted the board |
long-term implications for SOX, the | to be separate, with its own funding |
2002 legislation passed in the wake | stream, and outside normal civil |
of the Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco | service laws so it could attract |
scandals. The outcomes may also | highly qualified specialists. PCAOB |
have implications for records managers, | membersâ salaries are more than |
information technology specialists, | $500,000 and are reviewed by the |
and compliance officers | SEC. |
who devise and implement company | Pro-business advocates, represented |
controls. | by the Free Enterprise |
Section 404 of SOX requires | Fund, argue that the PCAOBâs governance |
company auditors to attest to the | structure is unconstitutional |
soundness of the firmâs internal | because it is an independent |
controls and financial statements. | agency that does not allow for the |
Internal controls may include anything | president to appoint members. Additionally, |
from transaction approval authorizations | because only the president |
to records retention | can remove SEC commissioners |
programs. This provision is widely | for cause, and because |
blamed for an increase in auditorsâ | the SEC can only remove PCAOB |
fees, as well as increased expenditures | members for cause, some court |
to ensure that proper internal | members believe this is a formerly |
controls are in place. | unrecognized limit of the presidentâs |
Small firms â those with | powers that may contradict |
less than $75 million in | the constitution. |
market capitalization | The Supreme Court will take up |
â have protested that | the issue soon, and some legal experts |
compliance with SOX 404 would | believe that SOX could be |
cost them a disproportionate share | abolished completely if the court |
of their earnings. The complaint is | rules the PCAOB unconstitutional. |
supported by an independent study | |
conducted at Pennsylvania State | |
University, which showed that | |
firms just over the $75 million | |
mark paid nearly $700,000 more in | |
audit fees and had average earnings | |
of negative $1.4 million in 2004 |