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You are a policy advisor responsible for air pollution in a region where there are only two chemical plants run by firm A and firm B. Firm Aâs pollution abatement costs are 2x^3 , where x is a unit of pollution. Firm B is newer and has pollution abatement costs of 2x^2 . Assume that neither firm is initially abating pollution. The per-unit benefit to a unit of pollution abatement is a constant $600.
Question: Suppose your boss, an elected politician, decides that each firm must reduce pollution by exactly the same amount. Is this socially optimal?
You are a policy advisor responsible for air pollution in a region where there are only two chemical plants run by firm A and firm B. Firm Aâs pollution abatement costs are 2x^3 , where x is a unit of pollution. Firm B is newer and has pollution abatement costs of 2x^2 . Assume that neither firm is initially abating pollution. The per-unit benefit to a unit of pollution abatement is a constant $600.
Question: Suppose your boss, an elected politician, decides that each firm must reduce pollution by exactly the same amount. Is this socially optimal?
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Paramjeet ChawlaLv8
28 Sep 2019