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Continue to consider this discrete Bertrand model, but now assume that each student has a constant cost of 5 that is deducted from all payoffs. So whoever has the low number wins their number, minus 5. Whoever has the high number loses 5 total. In the event of a tie, each student wins an amount equal to their number divided by two, then minus five. Find any Nash equilibria in this game. Explain your reasoning.
Continue to consider this discrete Bertrand model, but now assume that each student has a constant cost of 5 that is deducted from all payoffs. So whoever has the low number wins their number, minus 5. Whoever has the high number loses 5 total. In the event of a tie, each student wins an amount equal to their number divided by two, then minus five. Find any Nash equilibria in this game. Explain your reasoning.
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skytermite28Lv1
2 Jun 2021