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Consider an all-equity financed firm that has an opportunity to invest in one of two mutually-exclusive projects. Each project requires an investment today of £400 million. In one year’s time, project A pays £520 million with probability 80% and £200 million with probability 20%. Next year, project B pays £600 million with probability 20% and £200 million with probability 80%. After these cash flows, the firm will be shut down. There are no taxes, depreciation, or any other benefits or costs. To implement one of these projects, the firm must raise debt financing. Note that the managers of the firm will act in the interests of the equity holders and that project choice occurs after debt financing is granted, so debtholders cannot control the choice of project after financing. However, debtholders can rationally anticipate the actions of managers. When answering this question, state any additional assumptions you may need to make. Show your calculations. For parts (a) and (b), assume all cash-flows are discounted at 0%. a. Compute the NPVs of the two projects. Which project is better? b. Show that the firm will be able to raise £400 million today via the issue of debt. Compute the terms of the debt (i.e. the face value) required by lenders. For parts (c) and (d) assume, instead, that all cash flows are discounted at 12%. c. Recompute the NPVs of the two projects. Which project is better now? d. Show that the firm will not now be able to raise £400 million today via the issue of debt. Explain why this is so. Be precise; show your steps and explain your reasoning.

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