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In chapter 4 of The Great Transformation, Karl Polanyi shows how markets have largely been incidental to human economic organization until the end of feudalism and the recent advent of capitalism. Using the concepts of reciprocity, distribution, and householding (you should define and explain these three concepts), explain how until markets became important, the economy of a society was largely embedded within its social institutions.

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Related questions

1. An economic system is

a. a set of institutional arrangements used to allocate scarce resources.

b. the movement of capital between countries.

c. how wealth is distributed and created in a country.

d. the natural resource available.

e. none of the above.

 

2. Contemporary economic change in Eastern Europe was preceded by

a. declining economic performance.

b. political change.

c. the withdrawal of Soviet backing.

d. all of the above.

 

3. Prior to the onset of economic reform in the late 1980s, the Soviet Union and most Eastern European countries allocated resources primarily by means of

a. Markets.

b. national economic plans.

c. neither a nor b.

d. both a and b.

 

4. Prices in the planned socialist systems were generally set by

a. supply and demand forces in the market.

b. the state.

c. external forces through international trade.

d. none of the above.

 

5. A major political change in the former planned socialist economies has been

a. the end of the political domination of Communist regimes.

b. the strengthening of the Communist regimes in combination with economic decentralization.

c. the full implementation of Western-style democracy.

d. all of the above.

 

6. The modern approach to defining economic systems

a. is based on the ”isms” of capitalism and socialism.

b. emphasizes resource allocation arrangements over incentive systems.

c. defines economic systems according to a number of characteristics.

d. states that defining economic systems is impossible.

e. none of the above.

 

7. The major attributes of an economic system are

a. its population and capital resources.

b. its level of GDP.

c. its level of GDP per capita.

d. its economic policies.

e. none of the above.

 

8. One very important characteristic of organizations in the comparing of economic systems is

a. the nature of economies of scale.

b. whether they exhibit capitalism or socialism.

c. the use of computers in the organization.

d. the level of centralization or decentralization of decisions.

e. none of the above.

 

9. A planned economy is one in which

a. subunits are coordinated by directives formulated by a superior agency.

b. subunits are not induced by appropriate incentives to carry out plan directives.

c. market allocation is combined with planned allocation.

d. a ministerial system prevails.

e. none of the above.

 

10. Ownership rights may affect economic outcomes because

a. public and private owners may have different time preferences.

b. public ownership may mean more attention to social rates of return.

c. the distribution of income is affected by ownership arrangements.

d. answers a and b are correct. e. answers a, b, and c are correct.

 

11. Which of the following would not be classified as an economic-environmental factor?

a. Natural resource endowments

b. The size of the economy

c. The nature of decision-making arrangements

d. The economy’s per capita income

e. The economy’s labor force

 

12. If one finds that the planned socialist economies all have higher growth rates than capitalist countries, this shows that

a. planned socialism necessarily produces higher growth than capitalism.

b. planned socialism may produce higher growth than capitalism, ceteris paribus.

c. capitalism may produce higher growth than planned socialism, ceteris paribus.

d. capitalism necessarily produces higher growth than planned socialism.

e. both b and c are correct.

 

13. National priorities tend to be

a. the same for countries that have similar economic systems.

b. the same for all countries.

c. different for different countries.

d. completely unknown.

e. none of the above.

 

14. Economic growth measures

a. the increase in nominal income.

b. the increase in the volume of output on either a total or a per capita basis.

c. the growth of efficiency.

d. the growth of productivity.

e. none of the above.

 

15. A measure of economic instability is

a. the unemployment rate.

b. the inflation rate.

c. the business cycle.

d. the Lorenz curve.

e. all except d are correct.

 

16. In the real world, most economic systems are in fact

a. centralized systems.

b. mixed systems.

c. market systems.

d. planned systems.

 

17. Although economic reform is difficult to characterize with precision, reform in planned socialist systems has typically been thought of as

a. revolutionary or abrupt in character.

b. occurring gradually over time.

c. successful in most cases.

d. none of the above.

 

18. In the United States, social security transfers as a percentage of the gross national product have

a. increased.

b. decreased.

c. remained the same.

d. fluctuated but with a significant downward trend.

 

19. In the industrialized capitalist systems, taxes as a percentage of the gross national product have

a. increased.

b. decreased slightly.

c. decreased greatly.

d. remained the same.

 

20. In contemporary capitalist economic reforms, privatization means

a. expansion of private ownership of the means of production.

b. improvement of planning methods.

c. implementation of worker management.

d. none of the above.

Write a summary of of this article below. You should write at least one paragraph.

ABSTRACT
Feminist theories in sociology reflect the rich diversity of general theoretical
orientations in our discipline; there is no one form of feminist theory. The development
of these theories over the last 25 years has only recently begun to
influence the mainstream theory canon, which has much to learn from their insights.
This chapter demonstrates why feminist versions of the following theory
types should be more fully integrated into mainstream sociological theory:
neo-Marxist, macro-structural, exchange, rational choice, network, status expectations,
symbolic interactionist, ethnomethodological, neo-Freudian, and social
role. Feminist standpoint theory, an epistemological critique of mainstream sociology,
is discussed at the beginning, and the chapter concludes with a brief
account of the newly developing effort to theorize the intersection of race, class,
and gender.
INTRODUCTION
The term “feminist theory” is used to refer to a myriad of kinds of works, produced
by movement activists and scholars in a variety of disciplines; these are
not mutually exclusive and include: (a) normative discussions of how societies
and relationships ought to be structured, their current inequities, and strategies to
achieve equity; (b) critiques of androcentric classical theories, concepts, epistemologies,
and assumptions; (c) epistemological discussions of what constitute
appropriate forms, subject matters, and techniques of theorizing from a feminist
perspective; and (d ) explanatory theories of the relationship between gender and

various social, cultural, economic, psychological, and political structures and
processes. Much of this work is explicitly interdisciplinary in inspiration and
intended audience. To complicate matters further, there is no consensus on the
exact meaning of the word “feminist,” which makes it difficult to distinguish
with precision between theoretical material that pertains to gender (e.g. Parsons
1949, 1955, which no one would label feminist) and gender-related theory that
is specifically “feminist.” Finally, there is little consensus among feminist sociologists
about the basic theoretical questions that require an answer, resulting
in the proliferation of theories at a low level of abstraction that explain specific
phenomena (e.g. pay inequity), in addition to more abstract, general works.
To remain within the limits of one chapter, I confine this review in several
ways, beginning by excluding feminist theory that has not been produced or used
extensively by sociologists. While feminist theory is often defined as “womencentered”
(e.g. Lengermann & Niebrugge 1996:436; Smith 1979, 1987; Alway
1995), I use a definition that focuses more broadly on gender, yet maintains the
normative emphasis implied by all definitions of the term feminist, which thus
enables one to distinguish feminist from other gender-relevant theory.

Some feminists focus on those contemporary theories and texts that ignore
the contributions of feminist theories and the topic of gender and conclude that
feminist contributions remain largely ghettoized within our discipline (e.g.Ward
& Grant 1991, Alway 1995). My view is that, while progress has been made
in integrating feminist concerns and insights into the discipline’s theoretical
discourse, much work remains to be done. This chapter demonstrates the
abundance and variety of feminist theoretical insights that can and already have
to some extent contributed to a more robust theoretical understanding of social
life, one which reflects the centrality of gender in virtually all sociocultural
contexts. It also demonstrates that feminist theories emanate from, critique, and
revise the rich array of theoretical traditions that define our discipline. Space
limitations preclude much discussion of precisely how feminist theories can be
better integrated with mainstream ones. Rather, I focus attention primarily on
reviewing the central insights of feminist theories in order to better inform those
sociologists who may be unfamiliar with much of this body of work about the
rich array of theoretical ideas that are at their disposal.

EPISTEMOLOGICAL ISSUES
Much of the literature that is labeled “feminist theory” consists of epistemology
and epistemological critiques of “malestream” sociology. Its foundations reflect
several nonfeminist traditions, especially Marx’s and Mannheim’s discussions
of ideology, Foucault’s work on knowledge and power, and phenomenological
and ethnomethodological approaches, the exact mix of influences varying by
author. While this work makes important contributions to these traditions, for
two reasons I believe that it is a misnomer to call thiswork feminist epistemology
(or theory). First, the issues raised are not in any fundamental way different
from those raised by many scholars who haveworked in these traditions but have
not been interested specifically in women or committed to feminism. Feminists
extend their insights in important ways, but this does not constitute a uniquely feminist approach to sociology. Second, many women in sociology, whose
scholarship they and others consider as well within the feminist tradition, do
not agree with this perspective.
Feminist scholars in a number of disciplines critique what they define as
mainstream, “masculinist,” “objectivist,” and “positivist” social science, and
develop a “feminist” alternative called standpoint theory. In sociology, the
two most widely cited are Dorothy Smith (especially 1987, 1990, also 1979,
1989) and Patricia Hill Collins (especially 1990, also 1986, 1989), whose basic
ideas constitute the focus of this section (see also Harding 1986, 1991). Where
Smith focuses on developing a “woman’s standpoint,” Collins’ work is directed
at an Afrocentric feminist standpoint epistemology. The Issue of Essentialism
Feminist standpoint theory, which is highly attuned to reification committed by
mainstream sociologists, cannot avoid reifying the genders. While Smith and
Collins explicitly recognize considerable variation among women (and presumably
men) in their experiences and consciousness, their own logics, and
many times wording, make it clear that they assume that there are overarching,
gender-specific standpoints; they could not otherwise talk about a “masculine”
form of discourse. In addition, Collins explicitly cites such feminist theorists
as Gilligan (1982) and Chodorow (1978, also 1974), who argue that the
genders are fundamentally different in their moral reasoning and capacities
for/commitments to interpersonal relationships.
Positing dichotomous gender differences that are treated as transcultural and
transhistorical is termed “essentialism,” a view that has substantial currency
among feminists in a variety of disciplines but is hotly contested in our own
(e.g. Lorber et al 1981, Coser 1989, Epstein 1988). The empirical evidence for
it is flawed, often based on small, nonrandom, American samples, and typically
finds only modest differences, along with extensive overlap, between the sexes.
Essentialist thinking converts differences of degree into differences of kind. The
presumed but often unstated origin of essential differences includes psychodynamics
rooted in the parental division of labor (Chodorow 1978) and biological
sex (Rossi 1977, 1984). It has become common for feminist scholars to recognize
within-gender categorical differences (e.g. race, class), but this awareness
of difference has often failed to preclude essentialist thinking about basic personality
and value orientations (e.g. the assumption that, regardless of other
differences, women are nurturant and oriented toward personal relationships,
while men are individuating and oriented toward abstract moral principles).
Given that the evidence suggests modest between-sex and considerable withinsex
differences on virtually all individual-level traits, a dichotomous gender
variable is theoretically useless when speaking of individual-level phenomena.
Explanations that begin by categorically attributing different characteristics
to women and men—cognitive, emotional, relational, and/or behavioral—not
only exaggerate differences in the distribution of such traits by gender, they also
implicitly treat these variables as dichotomous rather than continuous.

Can you summarize this article and wrtite down some important points regarding GDP?

NEW YORK – Striving to revive the world economy while simultaneously responding to the global climate crisis has raised a knotty question: are statistics giving us the right “signals” about what to do? In our performance-oriented world, measurement issues have taken on increased importance: what we measure affects what we do. If we have poor measures, what we strive to do (say, increase GDP) may actually contribute to a worsening of living standards. We may also be confronted with false choices, seeing trade-offs between output and environmental protection that don’t exist. By contrast, a better measure of economic performance might show that steps taken to improve the environment are good for the economy. Eighteen months ago, French President Nicolas Sarkozy established an international Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress, owing to his dissatisfaction – and that of many others – with the current state of statistical information about the economy and society. On September 14, the Commission will issue its long-awaited report. The big question concerns whether GDP provides a good measure of living standards. In many cases, GDP statistics seem to suggest that the economy is doing far better than most citizens’ own perceptions. Moreover, the focus on GDP creates conflicts: political leaders are told to maximize it, but citizens also demand that attention be paid to enhancing security, reducing air, water, and noise pollution, and so forth – all of which might lower GDP growth. The fact that GDP may be a poor measure of well-being, or even of market activity, has, of course, long been recognized. But changes in society and the economy may have heightened the problems, at the same time that advances in economics and statistical techniques may have provided opportunities to improve our metrics. For example, while GDP is supposed to measure the value of output of goods and services, in one key sector – government – we typically have no way of doing it, so we often measure the output simply by the inputs. If government spends more – even if inefficiently – output goes up. In the last 60 years, the share of government output in GDP has increased from 21.4% to 38.6% in the US, from 27.6% to 52.7% in France, from 34.2% to 47.6% in the United Kingdom, and from 30.4% to 44.0% in Germany. So what was a relatively minor problem has now become a major one. Likewise, quality improvements – say, better cars rather than just more cars – account for much of the increase in GDP nowadays. But assessing quality improvements is difficult. Health care exemplifies this problem: much of medicine is publicly provided, and much of the advances are in quality. The same problems in making comparisons over time apply to comparisons across countries. The United States spends more on health care than any other country (both per capita and as a percentage of income), but gets poorer outcomes. Part of the difference between GDP per capita in the US and some European countries may thus be a result of the way we measure things. Another marked change in most societies is an increase in inequality. This means that there is increasing disparity between average (mean) income and the median income (that of the “typical” person, whose income lies in the middle of the distribution of all incomes). If a few bankers get much richer, average income can go up, even as most individuals’ incomes are declining. So GDP per capita statistics may not reflect what is happening to most citizens. We use market prices to value goods and services. But now, even those with the most faith in markets question reliance on market prices, as they argue against mark-to-market valuations. The pre-crisis profits of banks – onethird of all corporate profits – appear to have been a mirage. This realization casts a new light not only on our measures of performance, but also on the inferences we make. Before the crisis, when US growth (using standard GDP measures) seemed so much stronger than that of Europe, many Europeans argued that Europe should adopt US-style capitalism. Of course, anyone who wanted to could have seen American households’ growing indebtedness, which would have gone a long way toward correcting the false impression of success given by the GDP statistic. Recent methodological advances have enabled us to assess better what contributes to citizens’ sense of well-being, and to gather the data needed to make such assessments on a regular basis. These studies, for instance, verify and quantify what should be obvious: the loss of a job has a greater impact than can be accounted for just by the loss of income. They also demonstrate the importance of social connectedness. Any good measure of how well we are doing must also take account of sustainability. Just as a firm needs to measure the depreciation of its capital, so, too, our national accounts need to reflect the depletion of natural resources and the degradation of our environment. Statistical frameworks are intended to summarize what is going on in our complex society in a few easily interpretable numbers. It should have been obvious that one couldn’t reduce everything to a single number, GDP. The report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress will, one hopes, lead to a better understanding of the uses, and abuses, of that statistic. GDP Fetishism - Project Syndicate 2/8/10 4:05 PM http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/stiglitz116/English Page 2 of 3 The report should also provide guidance for creating a broader set of indicators that more accurately capture both well-being and sustainability; and it should provide impetus for improving the ability of GDP and related statistics to assess the performance of the economy and society. Such reforms will help us direct our efforts (and resources) in ways that lead to improvement in both. Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2009. www.project-syndicate.org Reprinting material from this website without written consent from Project Syndicate is a violation of international copyright law. To secure permission, please contact [email protected]. tvselvakumaran 05:30 30 Sep 09 The official consensus Professor Martin Feldstein's latest article, "The G-20's Empty Promises" on Project Syndicate needs careful consideration. In his article, Professor Feldstein essentially adopts the "official consensus" of the economics profession on the current economic crisis. This official consensus, in its various mainfestations, has also been elaborated on by other famous economists, notably Professor Robert Lucas in his article in the Economist in early August, and by Professor Paul Krugman in his recent article in the New York Times Magazine. One characterizing feature of this official consensus is a confidence (a.k.a. triumphalism) in the certainty of outcomes predicted by modern economic theory. The main precepts of this official consensus are (i) Professor Ben Bernanke, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, has at his disposal all the theoretical tools of economics that are necessary and sufficient to deal with the current economic crisis. As Professor Lucas explains it in his Economist article, if one were able to predict in advance exactly when a market crash would occur, it would imply that the market entertains arbritrage opportunities. Hence, it is not possible to predict financial crises in advance. However, except for the precise timing of the occurrence of financial crises, macroeconomic theory could explain the workings of the economy completely. In particular, to avert the recurrence of the Great Depression, certain actions were needed to be taken by the Fed -- the specifics of these actions were all clearly understood by the economics profession. However, it was politically untenable to take these actions before there was a financial crisis. Once the financial crisis occurred though, Professor Bernanke could intervene in the markets and take the necessary actions (in the Fall of 2008). These actions include the injection of several trillion dollars into the economy and making the availability of credit the cheapest possible. The actions taken by the Fed have now resulted in the economy avoiding a recurrence of the Great Depression. This is, in brief, what Professor Lucas has stated in his Economist article. (ii) Thus in Professor Lucas' interpretation of things, the collapse of Lehman Brothers, for example, was necessary, in order to justify the intervention of the Federal Reserve in the functioning of the markets. The collapse of Lehman Brothers was, although regrettable, an unavoidable event. But, on the whole, monetary policy, even if it is a profligate one, would be necessary and sufficient to prevent the recurrence of the Great Depression, in Professor Lucas' view. Furthermore, the old wisdom of the Chicago School that government should be kept minimal at all times continues to hold, even in light of the current economic crisis. The Keynesians led by Professor Krugman, on the other hand, believe that Lehman Brothers should never have been allowed to fail. In their view, when the Fed's fund rate is at zero, monetary policy is largely ineffective for sustaining and stimulating economic activity. This is because of liquidity traps caused by businessmen who don't see economic opportunities that would induce them to borrow the cheap money available from the banks. Hence the government should step in to provide massive fiscal assistance to the economy by taking on spending directly, even if it means assuming trillions of dollars of public debt. (iii) Professor Krugman scored a lot of points by pointing out that the current state of economic theory, highly influenced as it is by the efficient market hypothesis of the Chicago School, indicated that a crisis of such magnitude as the current economic crisis could not happen at all. This fundamental failure to recognize that an enormous crisis could indeed happen, calls for the overthrow of the policy that markets provide the best social gain when they are completely free from government interference. From first impressions, it might seem that the views of the monetarists and Keynesians are vastly different. However, it is important to note that in the view of the Keynesians too, once large scale government spending as prescribed by the Keynesians is instituted, there is again enough assurance that modern economic theory (although with a heavy Keynesian tilt) would be sufficient to deal with the current economic crisis. (iv) In this regard, perhaps it is relevant to refer here to Professor Robert Shiller's latest article, "Re-inventing Economics" on Project Syndicate. Professor Shiller points out that the free market ideology fails to identify bubbles. Because of the belief that markets know best on all occasions, bubbles cannot occur according to the free market ideology. Professor Shiller's approach pursues a different branch of the Keynesian school of thought than the big spenders. Rather than advocate large government spending to avert a depression, Professor Shiller proposes using techniques from behavioral psychology to predict bubbles in advance. In this way, the socially harmful effects of massive misallocations of capital that arose in the case of the housing bubble or the tech bubble could be prevented in the future. In his other recent article, "Echo Chamber of Boom and Bust" in the New York Times, Professor Shiller elaborates further on the techniques that one could use for studying bubbles. Briefly, the process by which confidence or panic spreads in markets is very similar to the process by which diseases spread among populations. This outlook allows for introducing methods that scientists use to study epidemics into the study of bubbles. (v) The Keynesians have also managed to re-write the conventional wisdom on the advantages of a strong dollar. Through the works of Professors Barry Eichengreen, Jeffrey Sachs and Ben Bernnake, a consensus has developed that attempting to support the gold standard was a major cause for the prolongation of the Great Depression. This has resulted in a viewpoint among economists that a devaluation of the dollar at present would help to reduce global imbalances by restoring the American manufacturing industry. The implications of this viewpoint were analyzed by Professor Feldstein in his July 2009 article "America's Saving Rate and the Dollar's Future" on Project Syndicate, with the conclusion that devaluation of the dollar would necessarily lead to a better future for GDP Fetishism - Project Syndicate 2/8/10 4:05 PM http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/stiglitz116/English Page 3 of 3 America. Lost in this new interpretation is the fact that a stable dollar provides many economic benefits for America. The equity premium for American companies taking more risks globally, the transaction charges for providing market making facilities in global markets, and the provisions of liquidity for the currency of international trade are major drivers of economic growth for America, which derive from the dollar being the global reserve currency. (vi) Some other Keynesians have gone beyond questioning just the free market ideology. For example, in his latest article, "GDP Fetishism" on Project Syndicate, Professor Joseph Stiglitz proposes a broad set of economic indicators like health, well-being and sustainability rather than a narrow focus on GDP growth. Yet other developments imply that the rest of the world is steadily moving away from using the dollar as the main reserve currency. To finance this new global reserve system, the IMF has created $250 billion worth of Special Drawing Rights (SDR), and the IMF has indicated its intention to triple this allocation of $250 billion in the future. It would need a strong commitment from the policy-makers in America to re-claim for the dollar its position as the predominant global reserve currency. However, judging from the writings of American economists like Professor Feldstein, it appears that the consensus among professional economists favors devaluing the dollar instead. (vii) The official consensus is a result of a grand compromise between the Chicago School economists and the Keynesians.The conservative economists of the Chicago School would like to avoid the embarassment of getting publicly criticized for the failures of the efficient market hypothesis that this current economics crisis has severely exposed. So famous conservative economists like Professor Lucas have reached out for a consensus by indicating their willingness for a compromise. This compromise involves among other things, (a) foregoing raising concerns about the government's mismanagement of Fanie Mae and Freddie Mac, and (b) lending support to the Fed and the Treasury in their efforts to stabilize the economy, even if the methods that the Fed and the Treasury employ are highly inefficient. What are the Keynesians compromising on? Well, the Western liberal tradition has been intellectually bankrupt ever since the late 1960s. It is only the free market ideology of the Chicago School that has served as the driver of wealth creation in the advanced countries during the last four decades. Hence, the official consensus is a convenient compromise for the Keynesians to avoid asking difficult questions about the future of the Western liberal tradition. Instead, they would like to enact much drama in the media about the resurrection of their hero, John Maynard Keynes. (viii) One other characterizing feature of the official consensus in the economics profession is a collective tendency to "Blame It All On Obama". The conservative economists blame President Obama for not focusing adequately on America's ballooning national debt. The liberals, led by Professor Krugman, fault President Obama for getting distracted from the left's free spending ways by concerns on the size of the fiscal deficit. In the confusion that has ensued, President Obama's own team of economics advisors has fallen back on the official consensus in the economics profession. Availing themselves of the security provided by this official consensus, President Obama's economics team has misled the President thoroughly in economic matters. To begin with, the President is only empowered to administer the nation's affairs for a four year term. The projections put out by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) for the deficits in the next decade are only a non-authoritative guidance for where the nation's finances would be, if current policies hold for the next decade. Instead, the democrats have been behaving as if the $9 trillion of additional public debt that the CBO projects for the next decade is already a given certainty. In particular, they have not been careful to mention clearly in public discussions how much of this extra spending can be attributed to the President's own spending plans in his current four-year term. Neither have they shown any concerns for taking the Fed and the Treasury to taks for their highly inefficient methods to stabilize the economy. Because of these instances of neglect, the public is not willing to trust the government in financial matters. President Obama has rapidly lost his approval ratings. Professor Lawrence Summers, Professor Christina Romer, Professor Austan Goolsbee and Professor Peter Orszag are directly responsible for this abuse of public trust. (ix) The official consensus has also prevented economists from recognizing that President Obama's universal message of tolerance and justice, which has been received very favorably all around the world, actually opens up vast areas of economic opportunity for America. Unfortunately, it does not matter, for the economists, whether George W. Bush or Barack Obama is in office. The most they can do is re-work their models to favor Keynesian policies, and to argue that the policies they propose arise directly from their number-crunching methods. One might be tempted to attribute this widespread consensus among economists to stick to a narrow theoretical interpretation of the current economic crisis, to the certainty afforded by the mathematical models, which have become indispensible through the course of the 20th century, for the development of economic theory. However, this would be a big mistake. The official consensus in the economics profession is primarily a result of undue influences of power and money. It is much less a result of mathematically based economic theory. In the longterm, this attitude among economists of sticking to an official consensus is going to do serious damage to the American economy. Some other aspects of the official consensus have been explained very well by Professor Kenneth Rogoff in his recent article, "The Confidence Game" on Project Syndicate. I recommend that the reader go through that article. The official consensus is the single largest threat to a robust recovery in the global economy. The official consensus also gravely misinterprets the events of the Great Depression. The implications of this misinterpretation bear directly on the economic health of America.

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