SRA 231 Lecture Notes - George Tenet, Defense Intelligence Agency
Document Summary
Purpose: to prepare a draft analysis paper for peer review by identifying the hindrance/bias in each passage. Overall bluf: combination of confirmation bias, selective thinking, and a bias of ignorance led to an intelligence failure of iraq"s wmd program. The analysts relied too much on a questionable and unconfirmed source curveball for their intelligence as a result of confirmation bias and selective thinking. The analysts knew that their evidence were flawed but still believed they had a strong case because of a bias of ignorance. As a result, the report was flawed and inaccurate. George tenet, director of central intelligence (dci) and his deputy john mclaughlin went to the. White house on sunday, december 21, 2002 to brief the president, vice-president and the national security advisor on the intelligence regarding iraq"s nuclear, chemical, biological and missile programs. The president was not impressed with the evidence.
