ECON10004 Study Guide - Final Guide: Game Theory, Oligopoly

56 views1 pages
Each firm in an oligopolistic market must act strategically
Markets with only a few sellers:
Key feature of oligopoly is tension between cooperation and self
-
interest
Oligopolists are best off when they cooperate and act like a monopolist, but each oligopolist cares
about only its own profit
Collusion = agreement among firms over production and price
Once a cartel is formed, the market is in effect served by a monopoly
Cartel must also agree on amount produced by each member
Equilibrium for an oligopoly:
Total quantity greater than monopoly quantity, less than competitive quantity
-
Price lower than monopoly price, greater than competitive price
-
Earn total profit less than monopoly price
-
If duopolists individually pursue their self
-
interest, they produce:
Effect of oligopoly size:
Output effect
-
price > MC so selling more will raise price
-
Price effect
-
increasing output will increase total amount sold which will lower price and profit
-
At any time, each firm weighs two effects:
If output effect > price effect, firm will increase production
If output effect < price effect, firm should reduce production
As oligopoly grows in size and becomes more similar to a competitive market, magnitude of price
effect falls so price approaches MC and quantity produced approaches socially efficient level
Game theory and the economics of cooperation:
Oligopolists play a game similar to prisoners' dilemma
Self
-
interest makes it difficult for oligopolists to maintain cooperative outcome
Application to Oligopoly
Monday, 22 May 2017 11:24 PM
Intro Micro Page 1
Unlock document

This preview shows half of the first page of the document.
Unlock all 1 pages and 3 million more documents.

Already have an account? Log in

Document Summary

Key featu(cid:396)e of oligopoly is te(cid:374)sio(cid:374) (cid:271)et(cid:449)ee(cid:374) (cid:272)oope(cid:396)atio(cid:374) a(cid:374)d self-i(cid:374)te(cid:396)est. Oligopolists a(cid:396)e (cid:271)est off (cid:449)he(cid:374) they (cid:272)oope(cid:396)ate a(cid:374)d a(cid:272)t like a (cid:373)o(cid:374)opolist, (cid:271)ut ea(cid:272)h oligopolist (cid:272)a(cid:396)es a(cid:271)out o(cid:374)ly its o(cid:449)(cid:374) p(cid:396)ofit. Collusio(cid:374) = ag(cid:396)ee(cid:373)e(cid:374)t a(cid:373)o(cid:374)g fi(cid:396)(cid:373)s o(cid:448)e(cid:396) p(cid:396)odu(cid:272)tio(cid:374) a(cid:374)d p(cid:396)i(cid:272)e. Ca(cid:396)tel = g(cid:396)oup of fi(cid:396)(cid:373)s a(cid:272)ti(cid:374)g i(cid:374) u(cid:374)iso(cid:374) O(cid:374)(cid:272)e a (cid:272)a(cid:396)tel is fo(cid:396)(cid:373)ed, the (cid:373)a(cid:396)ket is i(cid:374) effe(cid:272)t se(cid:396)(cid:448)ed (cid:271)y a (cid:373)o(cid:374)opoly. Ca(cid:396)tel (cid:373)ust also ag(cid:396)ee o(cid:374) a(cid:373)ou(cid:374)t p(cid:396)odu(cid:272)ed (cid:271)y ea(cid:272)h (cid:373)e(cid:373)(cid:271)e(cid:396) If duopolists i(cid:374)di(cid:448)idually pu(cid:396)sue thei(cid:396) self-i(cid:374)te(cid:396)est, they p(cid:396)odu(cid:272)e: Total (cid:395)ua(cid:374)tity g(cid:396)eate(cid:396) tha(cid:374) (cid:373)o(cid:374)opoly (cid:395)ua(cid:374)tity, less tha(cid:374) (cid:272)o(cid:373)petiti(cid:448)e (cid:395)ua(cid:374)tity. P(cid:396)i(cid:272)e lo(cid:449)e(cid:396) tha(cid:374) (cid:373)o(cid:374)opoly p(cid:396)i(cid:272)e, g(cid:396)eate(cid:396) tha(cid:374) (cid:272)o(cid:373)petiti(cid:448)e p(cid:396)i(cid:272)e. At a(cid:374)y ti(cid:373)e, ea(cid:272)h fi(cid:396)(cid:373) (cid:449)eighs t(cid:449)o effe(cid:272)ts: Output effe(cid:272)t - p(cid:396)i(cid:272)e > mc so selli(cid:374)g (cid:373)o(cid:396)e (cid:449)ill (cid:396)aise p(cid:396)i(cid:272)e. P(cid:396)i(cid:272)e effe(cid:272)t - i(cid:374)(cid:272)(cid:396)easi(cid:374)g output (cid:449)ill i(cid:374)(cid:272)(cid:396)ease total a(cid:373)ou(cid:374)t sold (cid:449)hi(cid:272)h (cid:449)ill lo(cid:449)e(cid:396) p(cid:396)i(cid:272)e a(cid:374)d p(cid:396)ofit. If output effe(cid:272)t > p(cid:396)i(cid:272)e effe(cid:272)t, fi(cid:396)(cid:373) (cid:449)ill i(cid:374)(cid:272)(cid:396)ease p(cid:396)odu(cid:272)tio(cid:374) If output effe(cid:272)t < p(cid:396)i(cid:272)e effe(cid:272)t, fi(cid:396)(cid:373) should (cid:396)edu(cid:272)e p(cid:396)odu(cid:272)tio(cid:374)

Get access

Grade+20% off
$8 USD/m$10 USD/m
Billed $96 USD annually
Grade+
Homework Help
Study Guides
Textbook Solutions
Class Notes
Textbook Notes
Booster Class
40 Verified Answers

Related Documents

Related Questions