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Causes of War 11/13/2013 9:51:00 PM I. Introduction o War- sustained intergroup violence in which state military forces participate on at least one side (civil war-one side; interstate war-two or more sides) o 10 general wars (30 years War, Napoleonic wars, WWI, WWII, etc.) o Big wars between great powers have declined but wars in general have not (Cold War, Iraq war) o Interstate wars declined, civil wars increased Causes of war theory- why conflict turns to war, not so much the cause of the conflict o Issues of conflict 1) Interests (material) 2) Ideas This classification is useful but misleading, why? 1) Not mutually exclusive 2) Material interest is socially constructed II. What is the fighting about A. Conflicts of interests 1. Territorial disputes (historically had much significance) o Often used as force o Post colonial world: very strong norm of the sanctity of borders Partly why something like Iraq, Kuwait invasion was uncommon Holds much significance-1992 Pakistan nationalist marched into India but the police shot down their own people because the influence on the relationship between the two states would be too dire o Territorial disputes hard to resolve o Also an emotional element, matter of pride 2. Control over governments- not only to take territory but to install a friendlier government ex) During the Cold War, US support of Contras 3. Economic conflict- historically, economic conflict led to war, but now hardly lead to war because war would disrupt economy, trade even more, creates larger economic disruption; probably even more economic conflicts but deal in diff. ways; drug trafficking is a form of economic conflict that leads to military action B. Conflicts of ideas 1. Ethnic conflict o often had material interests at stakes but deeply rooted identity issues; sometimes might begin with territory or natural resources but evolve for ethnic issues o Sometimes want to secede, some secede and join a neighboring country, some don‘t have a state o Ex) Ethnic cleansing and war come together civil wars that result and external powers intervene to stop things like ethnic cleansing 2. Religious conflict o Intractable- absolute beliefs are fundamentally difficult to compromise o Sometimes lead to conflicts w/i state b/c it challenges secular political order o Can be transnational (ex. Islamic fundamentalism) 3. Ideological conflict o One way the Cold War can be classified as- communism vs. democracy o Realists argue ideology isn‘t important; yes, ideology isn‘t all determining BUT some evidence shows that ideological elements can matter 1) Revolutions can create sudden change that could be destabilizing and alter the balance of power 2) Mobilize national population III. Causes of War Our ability to explain why war occurs is limited b/c war is very complicated and there is no one cause BUT we use the levels of analysis and theories to break them down and get better traction on understanding them. A. Individual level- we can seek for explanation of war at individual levelcaused by human nature, personalities of particular leaders, limits on rationality B. Domestic level- Are some states more prone to war than others? If so, why? Different theories have different answers 1. Marxist theory- ―Yes, capitalist states are more prone to wars than socialist ones‖ o John Hobson (early 20 C): ―There is an inherent problem in capitalistic countries because they have a small wealthy minority and large, more impoverished minority‖End up with a situation where these economies produce more than they can consume o When there is a crisis of overproduction, capitalists invest oversees for overproduction to be absorbedresult is imperialism & imperialist wars where states fight each other for greater territory o One domestic explanation is ―Yes, to deal with prices of over production‖ 2. Democratic peace theory- Liberals- ―Democracies are less likely to go to war than authoritarian states because the people –not the rulers –have to pay the price, be held accountable; in authoritarian states, rulers can go to war without much personal risk‖  initial democratic peace theory o Further, democratic states have created a separate peace where they almost never fight each other; closest thing to a ―law‖ in international politics; democratic states hardly even skirmish with one another; only 1/8 a possibility for democratic state pairs to even threaten to use force against each other o Today, no established democracy has fought a war with one another in the 20 C the more democratic a state is, more likely to have peaceful relations with other democratic states o X mean democracies have no conflicts resolve through other means o X mean democracies are peaceful because people don‘t want to be held accountable still fight other non-democratic states; something about the relationship between democracies o Beside the cost of publics, democracies are quicker to reciprocate each other‘s behaviors, to go through other cores of conflict-resolution, to accept third party ratification? and adjudication o Pairs of democratic states are less likely to go to war with each other than non-democracy& democracy/ non-democracy & non-democracy 3. Domestic insecurity o Propensity to go to war increases when there are conflicts within the state/ society (based on the concept that domestic unity tends to increase when there is external crisis) maybe some leaders provoke/aggressive toward external tensions to increase domestic popularity (may be some truth but X predictable) 4. Nationalism –is it a catalyst to wars? Sometimes o Nationalism alone won‘t lead to war but when you have nationalism that involves intense commitment to the power and prosperity of state, when that commitment is strengthened by national myths that emphasize the moral, physical, and political strength of that statesometimes that will lead to war o But still X predictable because there are states with high levels of nationalism and don‘t go to war lots of debates on what types of nationalism leads to war C. Systemic level- systemic theorists, especially neorealist, see war very differently, one observation is that war sometimes happens even when no actor wants it, because there is nothing there to prevent it Ex) In a self help system, even defensive postures may threaten others and with a response in time, a security dilemma is created. By contrast, wars don‘t always arise when some do want it; there could be belligerence but won‘t necessarily lead to war because balance of power will prevent it. 1. Balance of power and polarity- balance of power can go both waysmay prevent/ deter but also be the immediate cause war (if that belligerent state doesn‘t heed the warning they may actually take some international action and other actors may need to do something to keep that state in check) o Different theorists have different insights about different balances/ types of polarity o The central proposition of the balance of power theory is that if a state threatens to dominate, other states will balance it o More specific insights about stability 1) Historically, most have argued that multipolar system is most stable (relatively equal distribution among the great powers is the most conducive to peace) o Proximate parity between powers in a multipolar system means that no single state has the ability to force its will on others o If there is an aggressor, there are lots of ways it can be stopped & different coalitions of states can form to stop that aggressor Multipolar system can work both ways 1) an aggressor can look and think I‘m never going to be stronger than them or 2)for whatever reason misjudge that and think they can be stronger, lots of other alliances can form to stop them o Conversely, with concentrations of power, those will be conducive to war because they reduce the number of blocking coalitions, less combinations that can happen to make things right o Relative equality among great powers increases uncertainty about the outcome of war or even alliances that can form which produces caution o Many also argue that a system with many central powers (multipolar system) produces crosscutting cleavages that may dampen any single conflict; crisscross web of interests where one state might disagree on one issue but need that state for another issue  less likely to go to war o Final benefit of multipolar system: Incorporate the role of a balancermay have the tendency for pairs of states to align together more for whatever reason but you can have a balancer who can shift their weight wherever it‘s needed to keep stability, which has happened before 2) Others have argued that a preponderance of power is better; want a big central power/ hegemondon‘t want to move towards equality o In a unipolar or hegemonic system, the hegemon will fear no one, X threatened, can get what they want without force, have no reason to go to war & weaker powers won‘t go to war because they know they will be defeated if they mess with the system relatively stable o Conversely, these theorists argue that in a multipolar system, you can always engage in wishful thinking 3) Bipolar system o ―Balance of power works differently in a bipolar system than in a multipolar system‖-Waltz and other neorealist argued that bipolarity was the reason that during the Cold War there was no great power war o Relatively peaceful among the great powers, though not completely peaceful; in a bipolar system, you have two states that are so much more powerful/ supreme than others, they can ignore others & use less force o Fewer sources of conflict; much less uncertainty (Ex. US, SU just focus on each other) o Interesting that theorists who support multipolar or bipolar systems both argue that multipolar systems have more uncertainty; where they disagree is the consequences of this uncertainty 1) Bipolarity reduces uncertainty and therefore reduces the likelihood of war by miscalculation, you know you will be defeated if you go to war with a superpower 2) Multipolar systems theorists say reducing the uncertainty increases the likelihood of war because it simplifies the calculations of the aggressor o Bipolarity during the Cold War 1945-1990 US & SU- 2 great powers whose status separated them apart from others; unlike any in the lead up to and after WWs 1950 US DNP of $381 billion and SU $126 billion but the next largest was only Britain with 71 (huge gap between economic power, great proportion used in military) & had atomic bombs Europe was divided into east and west, decolonized states aligned up on either side; there were wars fought in Africa, Asia and Latin America over allegiance but compared to WWs –limited & both sent military aid or their own troops to allies all over the world  BUT never fought each other despite having lots of reasons to do so 1) Could‘ve fought with other important states to switch sides of the balance of power like later with China or Egypt but didn‘t matter; conversely, it mattered a lot when someone switched in the 1700s because it switched the entire balance of power 2) domestic reasons–they hated each other – and they didn‘t have shared economic interests for the most part Benefits of bipolarity: both knew exactly who their enemy was, very little uncertainty and most part there was only one state who could threaten the vital interest of either one  in theory, makes things rather simple *note there is one other reason: both had nuclear weapons 4) Power transitions- one other important element in the systemic level of analysis in understanding war: the shift in power o Have been focused on as a danger point for war, esp. where there is a decline of a hegemon and a rise of another power- the moment is seen as the most dangerous for war by some theorist o Sometimes, extraordinarily great power Britain in 19 C and US in th the 20 C, but over time declines as always maybe because they let others free ride, support others at own cost because the cost seemed insignificant or seem to benefit from, overextension as they decline & see a challenger rising up, often that powerful state may cause war to prevent that challenger from rising up and to ensure their own power o Some authors argue that during the transitions of power, we are most likely to have war and in particular Major war is most likely when the military power of a dissatisfied challenger begins to approach a leading state, as that gap decreases, it is the most dangerous not just talking about power measured in terms of capability, talking about the moment of change in this distribution IV. Balance of power systems Pre-WWI th A. Mid-17 C ~ The Congress of Vienna (1815) o During this period, 5 states emerge as great powers (France Austria Britain Prussia Russia) & the conflicts between these states dominated world politics o None of them were strong enough to control others o Interesting that de facto balance of power –5 relatively equally powerful states –very quickly turned into a system that would work to prevent one state from becoming too powerful; states developed tacit rules to government conduct that weren‘t premeditated; unintentional but out of interaction with others a norm emerges 1) Limits on the means by which wars were conducted- beginning of the ―laws of war‖- general acceptance that not everyone was game, try to distinguish between combatant and non-combatant should be limits to warfare 2) General acceptance that a 5-state power balance would stay; it was in everyone‘s interest that one state didn‘t disappear/ get stronger Ex) 1740 Fredrick the Great of Prussia invaded the side of Austria not to take over all of Austria but to keep it from becoming too strong justified in defending the balance of power 3) 5 powers were vigilant in protecting this balance- when one state appeared to threaten it other states worked to maintain this balance quickly for example by balancing rather than bandwagoning, not buck passing – tended to take responsibility of the system 4) War is OK, best if quick & efficient –balance of power was not the absence of wars but of huge wars that changed the system this time period was X peaceful, lots of small wars and some bigger (Austria Wars, 7 Years War), but about stability among major powers which was in fact relatively stable o System began to destabilize by France during the French Revolution which was a blow to the balance of power because other powers X realize and react fast enough; Leading up to Napoleonic Wars, balance of power had worked well o 1792 new French Regime declared its intention to go offensive but wasn‘t taken seriously  French armies marched to Rhine but limited effort by Prussia and Austria & Prussia bandwagoned (secret agreement with France to leave Austria) o England was worried and tried to start an anti-France coalition, Austria joined but Russian was hesitant and Prussia was moving slow o So by 1812 Napoleon got very close to achieving French hegemony over Europe; balance wasn‘t working o Eventually, the balance of power kicks in & Napoleon over extends himself by invading Russia Grand Alliance defeats Napoleon in Waterloo, 1815 o *for awhile the balance worked well but some states got too ambitious, ideologies got in the way, freeriding etc.  Realist balance of power theory would then predict the end of the this balance of power system and go back to flexible system where alliances form as needed BUT once Napoleon is defeated, a very intentionally orchestrated balance of power system ―Concert of Europe‖ emerges B. The concert of Europe 1. What did it do? 2. Why and why then? a. Systems b. States c. Individuals 3. Why did it end? WWI 11/13/2013 9:51:00 PM World War I I. Introduction II. The July Crisis-Proximate cause III. Key Misperceptions A. Cult of the Offensive B. Belief in hostility of other states C. Empires are essential D. War is a good thing IV. Power as the underlying cause A. Multipolarity B. Distribution of power within multipolarity 1. Germany 2. Russia 3. Other great powers V. Conclusion Interwar period I. Introduction o Peacemakers in 1919 faced a challenge, in many ways, much more difficult than those of the Congress of Vienna (set up the Concert of Europe) o WWI had completely devastated Europe- first total war of industrialized society; 3 of the great powers faced internal revolt; British & French were in better shape but very weak o US entry into war turned the tables in favor of the Allies o US was led by Wilson, who thought the war was supposed to end power politics; ―Fought to do away with an older (used to call balance of power) order and establish a new one‖ II. Interwar Years A. Wilson and Collective Security o Wilson, idealist, described a plan for the post-WWI world in his famous 14 points –envisioned a community of nations built around the concept of Collective Security o Collective Security- threat to use force against one was a threat against all; All should combine to put down any potential aggressor; League of Nations was to be the institutional manifestation of collective security o WWI ends countries in Europe are devastated o US envisions the world to be very different from what it is; Wilson‘s vision of what they the world should look like was not equally shared by European statesmen-sounded nonsensical o Europe was split by political passions, political hatred and racism that was at a peak; WWI began to take on a quasi-religious character –if you look at racist draft posters of Germans and Russiansnot a lot of sentiment for reconciliation with enemies for collective security for it required states to put their differences aside to come together for security B. Europe and the 3 Rs: retribution, retaliation, and revenge Some historians say that European nations had an intense desire for the 3Rs due to domestic political differences o Desire for retribution was combined in an uncomfortable way with the idea that only a new balance of power could maintain peace in Europe –felt they needed to go back to the balance of power o WHY UNCOMFORTABLE?  hard to put balance of power together with revenge because balance of power deals with: “don’t eliminate your enemies because might need them in the future, don’t create lots of little weak states because INTERWAR PERIOD- WWII Lecture 10/10 they’re going to be vulnerable targets to fight over; don’t create artificially weak states that will be dissatisfied and want to challenge the system” what is actually needed in a balance of power system are these relatively equal powers (Ex. So after the Napoleonic Wars, France is brought back into the pole) C. Treaty of Versailles- ended WWI o Broke all of the rules of balance of power politics in the spirit of retribution losers of the war X get the chance to express their views at the Paris Peace Conference (X Congress of Vienna that set up the Concert of Europe & France was invited to join) o degenerated into practed conflict between Wilson and his former allies about what to do with the defeated states o Wilson pushed his agenda to establish the League of Nations; France and Britain weren‘t interested, more concerned with punishing the Germans and in particular with extracting reparations (paying for the cost of war), and wanted German weakened to the point where it couldn‘t challenge the system again o Problems with the treaty 1) Want Germany to be powerless but rich enough to pay back  it was never really clear, especially France, how a weakened Germany without industry was expected to pay back massive reparations 2) From the perspective of balance of power was that is was vindictive; failed to restore anything like the legitimate balance of power Legitimate meaning representative of the underlying power in Europe Vindictive meaning placed the blame for the war on Germany‘s shoulders, imposed massive reparations absolutely no relation to their ability to pay, stripped Germany of its colonies, and took away some of the richest mining district and gave them to France, and saddled Germany with an unworkable, overly democratic system of government, the Weimar Republic  1989 peacemakers, discussing how to deal with Russia, remembered the lesson of post WWI/Versailles- “If you hit the losers too hard, you deal with the consequences later” D. The League of Nations o Does come into being but in the context of vindictive peace INTERWAR PERIOD- WWII Lecture 10/10 o Made it easy for Wilson‘s critics at home to attack his plan: ―the League was not a new international order based on collective security, it was an exploitative tool that the European powers would use to play their old game of power politics‖ o Did not appeal to many Americans who desired isolation and to return to normalcy US rejected the treaty and any membership in the League o League is supposed to be the preemptive international body for settling disputes BUT US is not a member, including Germany (because it lost the war and was vindictive) and SU as well (b/c anti-communism) o League- settled some small disputes but devastated in Ethiopia and Invasion of Manchuria III. The Road to WWII: a series of Structural Instabilities –political arrangements that were deeply inconsistent with the actual distribution of power A. Germany- Treaty of Versailles artificially dampened German Power o Germany‘s underlying power resources/capabilities remained unchanged –still the center of industry and population in Europe, still potentially the most productive economy, potentially the most powerful military, and potentially the largest ambition to improve their position o Arguably, Versailles placed a system on Germany that was deeply inconsistent with its power capabilities setting the stage in which they want to change their position (Moment in the SHIFT of power transition could be dangerous) o Setbacks of Versailles are interpreted as temporary in Germany o Punitive settlement of Versailles increased German resentment and solidified German desire to pursue their rightful –consistent with underlying power capability –place in int‘l politics B. Cordon Sanitaire o Versailles tried to set up a protective belt around the SU in an attempt to protect WE from ―the virus of communism‖ o SU comes to being in 1917 amidst WWI; commits to a worldwide proletariat revolution; International Organization of Communist Party tries to foment worker insurrection and communist party in WE (X just internal to SU but an int‘l mission) o WE states decide need to protect themselves from this ―virus‖ by setting up tiny little states in the middle of Europe (Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Hungry, Romania, Czechoslovakia, etc.) at Versailles INTERWAR PERIOD- WWII Lecture 10/10 o A column of weak, small states 1) Hopefully set up a buffer zone from the SU and everybody else 2) Fit very nicely with Wilson‘s doctrine of self-determination –if people have their own states, will more satisfied and won‘t be likely to shake things up internationally o Problematic from the prospective of balance of powerno way these newly born states surrounded by larger powers could protect themselves (the temptation may become too great and in fact it does  o Germans start to take advantage—first economically, set up a trading system that would increase the vulnerability of these states and by end of 1930s, Germans had set up an economic hegemony in Eastern Europe C. Asia- Japan’s rise to power in Asia mirrors Germany’s rise in Europe o Japan‘s economic strength grows faster than its political strength just as Germany‘s did the previous century o As their economy expands, Japan also sets up hegemonic spheres of economic influence—Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere – systematically designed to make Asian states vulnerable to Japan and to extract resources needed to build up their military o Without knowing what either one is doing, both have created mirror spheres of influence, using dependent economies to fund their rise in military power o In both cases, this can be called an empire of sorts: Japan starts w/ Manchuria and Korea o BUT expanding Japanese empire remains critically vulnerable: lacks many resources (oil) and by WWII, tricky to build a successful military w/o access to oil Oil and other raw materials that Japan needs are sitting very close by in the islands of Philippines, Malaya, Singapore—protected by a crumbling British empire o < Rise and decline of powers> D. United States o US withdraws from the World Stage –much of population and congress strongly isolationistunwilling to play the role of leader that the world distribution of power defines for it o Many reasons for American isolationism 1) Most drawn from domestic level; even presidents who wanted to play a role in international politics found it hard due to reasons of domestic politics INTERWAR PERIOD- WWII Lecture 10/10 2) Systemic reasons for not wanting to become involved: period before long-range bombs, nuclear weapons in fact X directly threatened by the instabilities in Europe & US Navy was growing in size and capability (which enabled them to better protect themselves if they had to weren‘t threatened) o Shortly after FDR comes to power, becomes very worried about what is happening in Europe & the rise of Germany October 1937: FDR makes a crucial foreign policy speech to pull the US out of isolationism and for a more active role of the US ―epidemic of world lawlessness spreading;‖ argued must be positive endeavors to preserving peace produced a massive outflowing of opposition from many citizen groups who X involved in the mess of European politics o 1937- French and British worried another war may be coming & Hitler has already caused a lot of trouble IV. The Politics of Multipolarity Unraveling of WWII doesn’t start with Hitler in the 1930’s, starts with the Treaty of Versailles that set up the structural instabilities—a historical example & illustration of the politics of multipolarity, the politics of high uncertainty and unreliable alliances and tenuous security the different angles of this politics A. France, Britain, the US (in context of multipolarity) o From a realist perspective, easy to imagine that there could always be a threat to stability and states & challenge the balance of power for whatever reason o For realist, not really about Germany; in a key sense, France, Britain, US could have collaborated to sustain the system to not lead to WWII, but bottom line- no collaboration between French and Britain until very late o WHY? British and French set very different, sometimes antagonistic, lines of policy while US had removed itself from the game 1) Split over Eastern Europe 1920s (What to do with EE security & who was to do it) o Early on it became clear that the League of Nations X become an effective means of collective security o French started to build their own system of help-self security rather than collective –by making alliances with Belgium, Poland, the Little Entente (Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Romania) INTERWAR PERIOD- WWII Lecture 10/10 BUT the problem was France was not powerful enough to protect these states on their own, needed Britain‘s help but weren‘t interested o Britain, with different interests, were also finding ways to better protect themselves from Germany differently: 925 British signed a pact that guaranteed the western border of Germany  clear that they won‘t be involved with the Eastern border & France would be left on their own if there was trouble  makes sense b/c British were looking out for their own vulnerability & how to protect their crumbling empire (if Germans want expand toward the west toward France and Belgium, it would directly threaten them unlike the East); Last thing Britain wanted was to get involved in a war with Eastern Europe –didn‘t care & France seemed willing to take care of it went back to own parochial conception of self-help and look back how they protected French territory prior- develop a Maginot Line- gigantic defensive rampart along Eastern frontier (Swiss borders ~Belgium) to protect themselves from any threat from the east, primarily Germany- giving up on protecting allies and protect themselves 2) Issue of reparation: overtime the question came up of whether the provisions of Versailles should be enforced or not—to gain massive reparations from Germany while crippling its economy YET France believed they still hadn‘t gotten enough from Germany (not vindictive enough) and thought they had been deprived of territorial compensation they believed they deserved o Versailles was walking a very thin tightrope, British realized this quickly, if France ever did—the French not only doubted the possibility of French demand being met but the desirability; came to understand that driving Germany into the poor house or more specifically forcing the Weimar Republic to print endless amounts of useless money was not going to solve any of the issues that arose from Germany‘s power o The British understood reparations X keep Germany down in the long term, instead vindictive reparations  lead to rampant inflation, domestic discontent, and domestic problems for Germany that would spill over into int‘l politics INTERWAR PERIOD- WWII Lecture 10/10 o French and Britain disagreeing, Britain wants the terms of Versailles revised but France thinks they haven‘t gotten enough  US settles the terms of solution, while they are trying to stay out, because they are more powerful than either two o US bankers agree to help French by helping them raise funds for their recovery Washington‘s argument: more or less, an economically strong Germany was only going to be a source of instability o Main point isn‘t what US did but the situation between the allies: division of interests among all three allies & result in confusing, sometimes conflicting, policies  Why important? Germans saw this and did the most they could to exploit the division between allies; basically Hitler seized the opportunity he saw in their division thinking he could get away with a lot in the face of their disagreement 1935 Hitler fully repudiates the Treaty of Versailles, rejects them including the restraints it had put on German military forces Why did he want to? Because of underlying inconsistencies Why was he able to do this? Lies in the politics of multipolarity: Germany, at this point is still weak in relation to any possible combination of Britain and France: Hitler argued he could get what he wanted with a strategy of divide and conquer, as long as his potential enemies didn’t combine against him as the past few years had indicated couldn’t; bet against the balance of power and in the short term, won the bet B. The Soviet Union o Deeply weakened and completely devastated by WWI, communist revolution, and excesses of Stalin—1921 SU produced only 13% of prior WWI, GDP dropped by 60% --BUT by 1920s made a remarkable recovery and back to before and even better which enabled them to spend more on defense o If SU had joined with either Britain or France, could have easily stopped Hitler but WWII o US had refused to grant diplomatic recognition to SU until mid 1930‘s WHY? Because they‘re communist, and red scares domestically (ideological component) & also a systemic level of analysis that explains INTERWAR PERIOD- WWII Lecture 10/10 why ideology could play the role it did: bottom line the US could afford to say no to SU, didn‘t need to and geographically isolated o Contrastingly, Britain and France dealt with communism domestically (esp. France with an active communist party) & much closer To jump ahead, they make a deal with SU much earlier than US, not because US hated communism more, but because they needed to // SU because needed protection from Germany o SU - more realistic about German threat early on, watching the same thing played out that Germany was seeing—nothing seems to be coming together; SU was worried and bandwagons recognizing the balance of power necessary to stop Germany in time wouldn‘t happen: Nazis Soviet Pact 1939- agree to not to fight each other & set secret protocol to divide Poland between them which is the potential future of all weak states C. Politics of Appeasement o Hitler had been arguing that 3 million Germans in the Sudetenland deserved self-determination, should be allowed to join Germany o Sept. 1938 Chamberlain &Hitler in Munich agreed to the partition of Czechoslovakia if he promised to leave the rest of Sudetenland alone o In 1930s appeasement meant giving the Germans what they wanted so hopefully they would be satisfied Chamberlains thought it was a realistic approach in the best he could envision given the unstable situation, the inappropriate solution that been imposed on Germany in Versailles, and the inability for anybody to join in to do anything because it had been obvious that the small weak states would not be protected and the League would not be effective; plan was to bring Germany back into the community of nations o Argued that Germany had some legitimate desires and Versailles was wrong from the perspective of international stability o **The problem was that appeasement couldn‘t succeed when things don‘t end at that point, in hindsight. (Germany might have been appeasable in early 20s but not 30s) o Bottom line: Germany wanted more power, did so with divide and conquer policy and kept other states from allying against Germany, continued to make incremental moves –rebuilding, getting stronger, building up military and industry o By the time Germany begins their campaign of open aggression, too powerful to be stopped by any one states, maybe even a coalition of states; INTERWAR PERIOD- WWII Lecture 10/10 Hitler had accumulated enough power to think that his bid for hegemony would be successful, why not keep going? o In a multipolar system, states are likely to make the mistake that Britain made –providing an aggressive state with an opportunity o Many neorealist would say that in a bipolar system, this would have been less likely because the responsibilities of what to do would have been very clear and balance of power kicked in sooner o Can certainly think of individual explanation for Chamberlain—seemed to engage a lot in wishful thinking, optimistic, believed Hitler because he wanted to BUT easier to hold these hopes in a multipolar system. In a bipolar system, decision makers find it harder to engage in that kind of wishful thinking because the situation is clearer and less uncertainty V. Hitler –WWII= “Hitler’s War” (oversimplified but true) o His personality was not critical in early phases, WE was not ready to work with SU and reparations imposed in Germany were so draconian, any bit of nationalism would have pushed for the Treaty to be revised o Later, more could have been attributed to his personality; how much he wanted the war and took more risks than some might have, but this could well be explained by politics as well o o His racist ideology, however, that promoted Aryan superiority, even leaving the Holocaust aside, definitely played a specific role Ex) When Germany invaded SU, some Ukrainians revolted against Stalin and wanted to ally with Germans, BUT Hitler thought the Slavs were so unworthy he declined Ex) Underestimated power of US because it was full of Blacks and Jews Ex) His anti Semitism led to firing the most crucial scientists in developing the atomic bomb VI. Planning for WWII o Sept. 1 1939 Nazis armies invade Poland Britain & France get together, declare war on Germany o US initially does nothing, FDR wanted to give extensive military assistance to Britain & France but Congress had passed a series policies of neutrality wars which forbid the US from selling weapons to any combatants Gets congress to repeal this embargo  Nov. 1939 US started to sell on Cash and Carry program (didn‘t last very long) INTERWAR PERIOD- WWII Lecture 10/10 o Oct.11 1939- Jewish refugee, Einstein, had a meeting with FDR & informed on the Germans working on way to harness the power of atom in a destructive device to his credit, FDR took this seriously and pulled together a group of key congressmen and got them to agree to fund a secretive military project: Manhattan project- goal was to take the knowledge growing in atomic physics to build an atomic bomb that could be dropped from an airplane; German effort was far behind o War does not start of well for the allies: Poland is defeated quickly and after short period of stagnation in the winter of 1940, Germany turned west to attack France—one of the most successful military campa
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