STAT 155 Study Guide - Comprehensive Final Exam Guide - Xz, Prob, Nim
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Combinatorial games games equilibria ( nash quuilibrio ) , evolutionary sum zero b: general d) correlated games sum, price. !2! a) co - of anarchy games operative: voting c) S is bounded set of be the games. I games the same set of legal moves. I is allowed to move is progressively xt s last there at is most a n bounded number rows if n started from such that all for. S - > s st for an xes to. X x 1 set of legal element of. M , an from y players alternately choosing to is ( x some. X s op last player to move wins lh=m2 lhtnu from which there is no move suppose i starts at r r. V 9 . r q r q - forever. Start on the from x . progressively bounded games. Xs c- x of steps of acyclic are number.
