SRA 231 Study Guide - Final Guide: Failure In The Intelligence Cycle, Confirmation Bias, George Tenet
Document Summary
Purpose: to identify the hindrance(s)/bias in each passage. Overall bluf: combination of confirmation bias, selective thinking, and a bias of ignorance led to an intelligence failure of iraq"s wmd program. The advisors relied only on a questionable and unconfirmed source, known as curveball. His intelligence was as a result of confirmation bias and selective thinking. The advisors knew that their evidence was flawed, but still argued they had a strong case due to a personal bias of ignorance. As a result, the report was flawed and inaccurate. A more accurate report would have stated the uncertain nature of the flawed evidence and the possibility that iraq"s wmd programs were far less extreme as originally believed. George tenet, director of central intelligence (dci) and his deputy john mclaughlin went to the. White house on sunday, december 21, 2002 to brief the president, vice-president and the national security advisor on the intelligence regarding iraq"s nuclear, chemical, biological and missile programs.
