PS125A Midterm Powerpoint guide.doc

19 Pages
170 Views

Department
Political Science
Course Code
POL SCI 125A
Professor
Barry O' Neill

This preview shows pages 1,2,3,4. Sign up to view the full 19 pages of the document.
Description
Political Science 125A Midterm Study Guide PowerPoint Outlines LECTURE 1 • Science background o Elements have protons, neutrons, and elections o Atomic number is determined by number of protons o Isotopes – elements with more neutrons than regular  Often unstable and can break apart o Nuclear fission – used to break atom up now without waiting by shooting neutron into nuclear o Nuclear breaks, energy is released with more neutrons o Chain reaction is sometimes the result • Atomic bomb o Uses fission of heavy elements like uranium or plutonium o How? Gun method or implosion creates a fast chain reaction  Shoot U 235 with a neutron to make it U 236, result is atom breaks apart o Critical mass – enough fissionable material packed that will release a neutron will generate more neutrons  Critical mass creates a chain reaction (cascade)  Critical point depends on type of material and density o Little boy – gun mechanism (uranium bullet shot into uranium target) o Fat man – implosion mechanism (neutron initiator and plutonium core with spherical shockwave that compresses) • Hydrogen bomb o Same as thermonuclear bomb o Much more energy given off by fusing light elements o Fusion requires heat; heat comes from fission  Example: H3 and H2 fuse together to form He 4 and a neutron • Nuclear fallout (lethal explosion effects) o Blast 50%, heat and light (creates fire) 35%, radiation immediate 5% and fallout 10% o Nuclear fallout is the residual radiation hazard that falls from the atmosphere after the explosion o Know that majority of effects come from blast and presence of nuclear fallout  More on fallout: ground burst leaves a crater where ground material has been vaporized and sucked into mushroom cloud—this settles back to earth and “falls out” of the sky, giving off radiation that cause sudden death or smaller effects that result in long term sickness • States with weapons o US first in 1945 o Followed soon after by Russia, UK (1949, 1952) o Then France and China (1960, 1964) o Israel and India (1970s, 1974) o Pakistan in 1998 and North Korea in 2006 o Is there some sort of chain reaction where countries get bombs?  Germany (research) -> US -> Russia -> China  India -> Pakistan (?)  US -> North Korea o Common delivery systems  Heavy bombers, ground based missiles (ICBMs), and submarine-based missiles (SBIMs) • Energy o Measured in kilotons or megatons  Thousands or millions of tons of TNT • Review (definitely know these) o Fission – releases energy by neutrons breaking large atoms o Fusion – releases energy by intense heat joining atoms  More powerful and complicated o Atom bomb uses fission while hydrogen/thermonuclear uses fission then fusion o They generate more heat and neutrons once initiated LECTURE 2 • History background of the bomb o 1933 – Szilard recognized chain reaction possibility o Nuclear power v. nuclear explosion – same process just explosion is faster o 1941 – MAUD report states testing cannot be done on a small level o 1939 – Einstein tells president uranium has extreme energy uses  Chain reaction can be created from using uranium o 1944 – Beils Bohr tells president to inform USSR about the bomb • Manhattan Project (1936-1946) o Most operations conducted in Los Alamos, Mexico o Trinity Test near Socorro, New Mexico in July 1945 • Why Germany Didn’t Join in Research o No materials (uranium), extra funds, safe area, possible bias against long- term projects o Maybe: physicists didn’t encourage it, Hitler’s bias o Meanwhile US feared German developments • Security Dilemma o Building bombs can be a cooperation problem  Two NE: Don’t build if don’t build, build if build o Can also be a Prisoners’ Dilemma  Dominant strategy to build  One NE, (build, build) but both better off if neither build o Deciding whether or not to use the bomb  Japan was ready to surrender, was it necessary?  Maybe demonstrate it in a deserted place?  Use it on a city but without warning?  Bombs used August 6 and August 9, 1945 • Nuclear taboo o Taboo – strong prohibition, not just wrong but unthinkable o Nuclear taboo (Schelling) – resistance from nuclear powers but still developed o August 14, 1945 – Dr. Ichiro Kiyose termed the atomic bomb “taboo in human society” o Maybe taboo deterred war?  Or was it the opponent’s having weapons that deterred war?  Or usefulness of military weapons?  Or combination of the three? • Late 1940s – surge of “atomic culture” and enthusiasm in consumerism o Ballpoint pens, “atomic” business names, etc. o Miss Atomic Bomb of Nevada in 1953 o Know: Enthusiasm became anxiety, McCarthyism, and build-up competitive attitude once Soviets got the bomb • General vocabulary o Conventional weapons are non-nuclear weapons o Strategic weapons – attack opponent’s homeland, production sites, and population o Tactical weapons – attack opponent’s military forces and are used on the battlefield • Truman Administration o General questions that shaped policy:  Nuclear weapons different in kind or just more powerful?  Used for defense or just deterrence?  If deterrence, how can retaliation appear credible?  Should they be controlled on an international level? o Truman’s initial policy (know!) – tied to Goodby reading  Nuclear weapons are not just more powerful conventional weapons  Opposition to proliferation  No real plan for actual war  No to preventive war (but not pre-emptive)  Scarcity of nuclear arms end soon  Emphasis on strategic nuclear weapons rather than conventional forces LECTURE 3 • President trend in deployed weapons o Progressive increase during Truman administration – 0 to appr. 70 megatons from 1947-1953 o Plateau and slight decreasing during Eisenhower administration – plateau at appr. 17,000 megatons, peaked at 20,000 and declined to appr. 10,000 • Overkill? o Maybe so many because they expected enemy to wipe some out? o Symbolic show of determination? o False signal of being irrational (like madman alert)? • 1940s and 50s – a-bombers and h-bombers of medium range in Europe (US), long-range bombers (USSR) • The strategic triad with three legs o Long-range bombers (1945-present)  Pros and Cons • Slow to arrive but can be recalled if there is a mistake • Vulnerable to defenses and first strike o SLBMs—submarine-launched ballistic missiles (1962-present)  Russian “Shark” submarine  Pros and Cons • Very fast to arrive but can’t be recalled • Invulnerable to defenses including first strikes • Communication is slow and unreliable o ICBMs—ground-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles (1958-now)  Atlas was the first US ICBM in late 1950s, USSR had their first one in 1958  Underground missile silos developed in 1960s  Pros and Cons • Fast to arrive but can’t be recalled • Invulnerable to defenses but semi-vulnerable to first strikes • Defense and Deterrence – Bernard Brodie o Both get someone to not do something o Defense – stops other party from doing something by physically interfering o Deterrence – induces other party not to try to do something by threat of retaliation o Role of Nuclear weapons  To deter (war is not really an option)  Able to retaliate after a surprise attack (anyone can fire a missile before an attack)  Able authority to fire them  Forces must be built up already—instead of mobilization o “Massive retaliation”  Do not fight the “war” with war—threat should be sufficient  How credible is this when enemy can respond with nuclear weapons?  Became known as “mutually assured destruction” • Role of nuclear deterrence o Soviet subversive activity? Invasion of Western Europe? Attack on US?  Threat of using weapons is more credible for the third possibility than the first o US NSC 1953 – public statement of US will consider use of nuclear weapons and serves as major deterrent against aggression into Western Europe o Regarding Western Europe – what is better, a large army (defense), or reliance on threat of using nuclear weapons (deterrence)?  Is the deterrence threat credible? How far would Soviets push US to test the credibility?  Are the weapons credible or useful if we never plan on using them? • Berlin Airlift in 1948-1949 • The Credibility Problem – when both sides have nuclear weapons, a threat to use them is not credible, it’s like threatening suicide o Possibly answer: devise limited nuclear options (Burr)  Would this work since it weakens deterrence? o Possible answer: make a threat that leaves something to chance  Surety of likelihood of things actually getting out of hand? o Possible answer: threat just cannot be completely incredible  Stupid o Possible answer: give nuclear weapons to allies in Europe  Not practical o Possible answer: create effective defense against nuclear weapons  Will that really work? o Possible answer: signal irrational behavior to create fear  Implausible • Three main concepts o Crisis stability/instability  First strike advantage? Am I vulnerable to a first strike? o Offense/defense advantage  Should I go there or let them come here? o Arms race stability/instability  Should I build more because he is building more? • Burr reading o Tension is Nixon getting briefed on SIOP worried about hand-tying strategy o Why does Nixon care? Why is the USAF pressuring him not to change? Nixon/Kissinger response? o Important terms  LNOs (limited nuclear options), SIOP (single integrated operational plan), NSC (national security council), FOIA (freedom of information act), JSTPS (joint strategic targeting planning staff)  Damage expectancy – sum of the probabilities that each target will be destroyed  Alpha (urgent strategic targets), Bravo (lesser priority targets), Charlie (urban economic targets) o Nixon’s goal: restrain Soviet conduct in Europe with threats (Air Force wanted more aggressive expansion) LECTURE 4 • Cuban Missile Crisis o 1957 – Sputnik launched (worries Americans) o 1958 – Khrushchev becomes premier; 1959 – Castro assumed power in Cuba; 1961 – Kennedy becomes president o January 1961 – US relations with Cuba terminated; April 1961 – Kennedy pledges US will not overthrow Castro, US then backed Cuban exiles at Bay of Pics o October 1962 – Soviet missile sites spotted o Kennedy ran on a platform to close the “missile gap” but US soon found out that US was actually leading the arms race  Russia knows that America knows it is winning the missile gap  Statement was made in private with Russian agents but not in public, why? Russia knows that America knows that Russia knows that the missile gap is favoring America o Khrushchev sends missiles to Cuba  Defense, restore strategic balance, respond to China, respond to US missiles in Turkey, signaling strength  Missiles spotted October 14, Gromyko told Kennedy they were only defensive on the 18th o Ex-Com options  Negotiate with no action, quarantine with sea blockade, surgical airstrike against missiles, full air strike and invasion o Week of October 22—intense public coverage of crisis  US applies measures this week one by one to allow Soviets time for response (and hopefully compromise) o October 26, KGB Chief Fomin tells reporter Soviets will dismantle under UN supervision while Khrushchev does not mention inspection o October 27, new letter saying Soviets want US missiles in Turkey gone; U-2 shot down over Cuba; Kennedy secretly agreed to missile withdrawal in Turkey o Trollope ploy – Kennedy ignored demand to remove Turkish missiles and sends response of no invasion if missiles are removed from Cuba o October 28, agreement made  Soviets leave with their missiles and Castro mad o Consequences  Increased salience of nuclear war to public  Increased cooperation for leaders • Value added to patience and avoid GroupThink (overconfidence)  Marked the strong possibility of accidental war  Did not learn irrelevance of “nuclear balance” • Why was it irrelevant? Neither side could tolerate war – the deciding factor was US conventional strength • Maybe it did have some psychological value or because they truly thought it mattered  Importance of avoiding mirror-imaging (do not assume other side sees the facts the same way as you) • Immediate Crisis Aftermath o Hotline Agreement (June 1963)  Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communications Life o Partial Test Ban Treaty (September 1963) • Verge of war o Possible causes of war actually starting  Premeditated (unlikely), escalation, “accident”, crisis instability (temptation to pre-empt the other) o Dangerous incidents during crisis week in Cuba  August 23 – US bomber came within 300 miles of Soviet coast  October 26 – ICBM test launch at Vandenberg  October – ICBMs “jerry-rigged” without safety tests  October 27 – Alaskan U-2 incident  January 1968 – Nuclear bomber crashes near radar site in Greenland • Recall three main concepts o Crisis stability/instability  First strike advantage? Am I vulnerable to a first strike? o Offense/defense advantage 
More Less
Unlock Document

Only pages 1,2,3,4 are available for preview. Some parts have been intentionally blurred.

Unlock Document
You're Reading a Preview

Unlock to view full version

Unlock Document

Log In


OR

Join OneClass

Access over 10 million pages of study
documents for 1.3 million courses.

Sign up

Join to view


OR

By registering, I agree to the Terms and Privacy Policies
Already have an account?
Just a few more details

So we can recommend you notes for your school.

Reset Password

Please enter below the email address you registered with and we will send you a link to reset your password.

Add your courses

Get notes from the top students in your class.


Submit