ATS1835 Chapter Notes - Chapter 4: Susan R. Wolf, Moral Agency, Free Agent
24 Mar 2020
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Incompatibilists will quickly point out that such an analysis is insufficient. For an agent who would have done otherwise if they had tried cannot be blamed for their action if they could not have tried. Any conditional analysis of they could have done otherwise seems too weak to satisfy the condition of freedom. For the claim that an agent can be moral only so far as his actions are psychologically determined - if our institutions require that both these claims are right, then the concept of moral responsibility must be incoherent. It seems that an agent can be morally praiseworthy even though they are determined to perform the action they perform. Free will is often defined as the sort of freedom required for moral responsility. Frankfurt argues that pap is false - to show this he developed the exmple of jones and black.
