PHIL 111 Chapter Notes - Chapter 1: Formal And Material Principles Of Theology, Practical Reason, Syllogism
The Political Philosophy of Kant Session 5 April 18, 1967
92
this law can be universally binding on all men regardless of what kind of temperaments
they were provided with by nature.
LS: Yes. And what, then, could be the difference between him and Aristotle? At least
what you have in mind now. That for Aristotle, the gifts of nature to some and the
withholding from others somehow forms part of our judgment of the man.
Mr. Schaefer: And also Aristotle seems to lay a greater possibility of the education and
the formation
20
of what was given by nature, in order that the affections can be directed
in a certain way by education. And that a man can be led—
LS: Ya,
21
I can see that Kant, especially in the section which you have read, makes the
impression of doing that, but this is not quite sufficient. But
22
it’s now a bit clearer to me
what you meant than before.
Now
23
as to this key point which Kant makes and will make more fully in the sequel, the
universality of the maxims: What does he mean by it? Take the example of lying.
24
I find
it in a given situation more convenient to lie. And how do I find out that this is the wrong
judgment, according to Kant?
Mr. Schaefer: Well, he says that the grounds of prudence must be clearly distinguished
from those of morality, and that what I must ask is, whether it would be all right if other
people, also finding excuses in particular circumstances, broke the law against lying.
LS: Ya, but in the first place, when Kant speaks of prudence he does not mean what
Aristotle means by prudence or practical reason.
Mr. Schaefer: Yeah.
LS: He means only—
Mr. Schaefer: Means.
LS: Calculation, calculation.
25
It is wholly amoral, whereas in Aristotle prudence is
essentially moral. Good. Ya, but I mentioned earlier in this course the doctrine of
Rousseau regarding the general will, I have my particular will—I took the example: I
don’t wish to pay taxes. And how does this desire look when I try to give it the form of a
law, a general law? And then it would mean: no one should pay any taxes. And then I see
that my desire is irrational. I generalize my will. Now Kant makes this more radical. He
doesn’t speak of generalization but of universalization, because it is not merely the
community to which I belong or of which I am a member, and
26
in the assembly of which
I vote, but all rational beings. And it is not the particular will or the particularly willed
object, but the maxim. Now what is a maxim?
Mr. Schaefer: A maxim,
27
as distinguished from a formal principle, is a law about some
specific kind of practice like lying, which—
The Political Philosophy of Kant Session 5 April 18, 1967
93
LS: A maxim is not a law in itself. A maxim is a general rule which I choose and on
which I act. For example,
28
I make it my rule to live as conveniently as possible. That’s
my maxim. Men may live under that maxim. Maxim comes from the Latin maxima,
namely, the first premise of a syllogism. Ya? The major, under which I subsume the
minor premise, and then I get the conclusion. [So Kant implies whether we make it clear
to ourselves or not, we all always act on maxims].
29
And these maxims may change, on
which we act, but in the case of every maxim on which I act, I must make clear to myself,
I must test it by universalizing it in the following manner: not only must I say that
everyone else ought to act or shall act on this maxim, but everyone else is under the law
to act under that presupposition. Then I must see whether this can still make sense. Now,
how would it work in the case of lying? I mean I, in a given case, find lying convenient;
and what do I do now?
Mr. Schaefer: Well, I have to consider whether, convenience aside,
30
it could be possibly
a rational law for everyone to break his promise, to lie, and then I see that—
LS: How would this testing
31
proceed?
Mr. Schaefer: Well, one imagines what would happen if everybody lied, and one sees
that—
LS: Not everybody lied, but everybody is morally obliged to lie. Is such a world [LS taps
on the table] possible?
Mr. Schaefer: He would say no, because if everyone were morally obliged to—
LS:
32
In other words, everyone is always under a moral obligation to say the truth, or at
least not to lie. That is the test. And this test by itself decides on whether my maxim is
moral or not. Good.
Mr. Schaefer:
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Is this fair to say, that a maxim is the grounds on which a person
justifies his action? In other words—
LS: You can say that, ya. But
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the point is that the maxim is as such not a law. But the
maxim is that on which I act, or habitually act, or act in this particular case. And the
maxim is to be tested by its ability to become a universal law. And therefore according to
Kant we do not need any other consideration, any experience, but merely this test in order
to know what is moral and what is not. Yes?
Student: Well, this case of lying, the universal law becomes “Everyone is under the
obligation to lie”.
LS: Pardon?
Document Summary
92 this law can be universally binding on all men regardless of what kind of temperaments they were provided with by nature. At least what you have in mind now. That for aristotle, the gifts of nature to some and the withholding from others somehow forms part of our judgment of the man. Mr. schaefer: and also aristotle seems to lay a greater possibility of the education and the formation20 of what was given by nature, in order that the affections can be directed in a certain way by education. Ls: ya,21 i can see that kant, especially in the section which you have read, makes the impression of doing that, but this is not quite sufficient. But22 it"s now a bit clearer to me what you meant than before. Take the example of lying. 24 i find it in a given situation more convenient to lie.
