POL-UA 330 Chapter Notes - Chapter 2: Statutory Interpretation, Harm Principle, Social Fact
22 Mar 2018
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Document Summary
Cane (2006): taking law seriously -the hart devlin debate. Cotterrell (2000): common law approaches to the relationship between law and morality. Tushnet (1983): critique of interpretivism and neutral principles. We already know textualism and intentionalism (synonmym for originalism) aren"t the same. Siegel says gap gets wider w time. Purpose can somehow stand independent of intention. Intent more individual- but hard to know the intentions of mult. Nelson both textualists & intentionalists seek to id and enforce the directives that a leg intended to est. They just differ regarding how best to do that. What does the text intend vs what did the framers intend. Textualism becomes more unworkable over time bc as you go deeper and deeper down the textualist rabbit hole you get divorced from best intended purpose. In quest for purity you will refuse notion of intention & purpose which takes you further and further from best meaning. Textualism the formalist axiom that statutory text is the law.
