PSC 321 Chapter Notes - Chapter 13: Tunisian Human Rights League, Democracy Promotion, Authoritarianism
18 May 2018
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Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World
Executive Summary
● Authoritarianism in the Arab world is stronger than ever despite the efforts of the US, the
EU and its partners, and Arab democrats
● While U.S. conceptions of Arab authoritarianism and U.S. strategies for promoting
democratic reform have remained largely unchanged during this period, Arab regimes
have not stood still
● After twenty years, Arab regimes have become proficient at containing and disarming
democracy promotion - if not exploiting it for their own purposes
● Two openings hold out particular promise, though both will require substantial
adjustments in U.S. democracy promotion policies
○ First, adapting U.S. democracy promotion policies to exploit more effectively the
openings that upgrading itself produces
○ Second, taking steps to weaken the coalitions on which upgrading depends
Upgrading Authoritarianism
● In recent years, a new model of authoritarian governance has emerged in a number of
key Arab states
● They have expanded political spaces - electoral arenas in particular - where controlled
forms of political contestation can occur
● They have also tempered their opposition to Islamist political participation
● Regimes have also adapted selectively to demands for economic liberalization and the
integration of Arab economies into global markets, and expanded opportunities for social
and economic elites
● Arab regimes increasingly seek out trade, investment, and political ties with states that
either share or are broadly sympathetic to the political concerns of Arab autocrats in the
Levant and North Africa, such as the Arab monarchies in the Persian Gulf
○ Yet they still continue to enhance their commercial relationships with EU
countries and the US
● Authoritarian upgrading involves reconfiguring authoritarian governance to
accommodate and manage changing political, economic, and social conditions
● There is NO single model or template of authoritarian upgrading that Arab regimes have
followed
● Authoritarian upgrading is shaped by what is called “authoritarian learning”
○ Regimes learn from one another, often through explicit sharing of experiences;
however, they also learn by observing experiences elsewhere
■ China is one country that has emerged as a model of particular interest in
terms of improving economic performance w/o conceding political control
● During the 1990s many new hybrid forms of authoritarian governance emerged,
including electoral-authoritarian, competitive authoritarian, etc.
● Coercion is still huge, as Ara regimes continue to police the boundaries of acceptable
political practice
● This new hybrid form of authoritarianism emerging combines strategies of the past -
coercion, surveillance, patronage, corruption, and personalism - with innovations that
reflect the determination of authoritarian elites to respond aggressively to the triple threat
of globalization, markets, and democratization
Key Features of Authoritarian Upgrading
● Appropriating and containing civil societies
● Managing political contestation
● Capturing the benefits of selective economic reforms
● Controlling new communications technologies
● Diversifying international linkages
● These key features are evident in major Arab states, including Algeria, Egypt, Jordan,
Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen
“Appropriating and Containing Civil Societies”
● The hallmark of authoritarian upgrading is the ability of Arab regimes to exploit rather
than reisst broad social, political, and economic trends
● Beginning in the 1980s, civil society organizations proliferated throughout the Arab world
○ By the 1990s, Arab NGOs had become an active presence in the region’s
political life
● Regimes gradually adopted a range of complex strategies to reassert state control over
burgeoning civil sectors instead of shutting down civil societies entirely
○ They eroded NGOs capacity to challenge political authority
● Regime strategies to address the growing activism of civil societies included repression
of those deemed especially threatening, intimidation and harassment of leading political
activists, legal measures, and laws relating to media control
● The most blatant example of legal reform was the highly controversial passage in 2002
of a revised Law of Associations in Egypt
○ The law imposed new restrictions on NGO activities, funding, access to external
resources, and participation in political activities
● Tunisia also used this tactic when it imposed new conditions on NGOs that essentially
forced the Tunisian Human Rights League to suspend its activities
● These tactics are also used in Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria
● The introduction of these new frameworks for the governance of non-profit organizations
and civic associations has weakened their autonomy and limited their capacity to
challenge government policies and practices
○ NGOs dependent on scarce local resources are also pitted against each other
○ Ambiguous legal environments make it hard for civil society groups to know what
they can legally do
● Suppression of independent NGOs has exposed Arab regimes to sharp criticism
○ To fend this off, coercion has been supplemented by additional strategies
through which regimes exploit the rhetoric and organizational frameworks of civil
society to generate political resources that can be appropriated and used to their
advantage
■ E.g. In Egypt, Jordan, and Syria regime elites have become visible
sponsors of semi-official NGOs that are in areas that are non-threatening
● Ladies in the Arab world are especially prominent as founders and sponsors of such
semi-official NGOs
● Semi-official or privileged NGOs serve a number of useful functions
○ Provide meaningful services to citizens
○ Draw local and international attention to worthy causes
○ Attract both domestic and international funding
● Despite these benefits, these NGOs are incapable of playing an autonomous political
role
○ They offer regimes opportunities to posture as supporters of civil society while
preventing the emergence of autonomous civic life and insulating themselves
from any meaningful public accountability
● Regimes insert themselves directly into key political debates in which civil societies have
been especially vocal, most notably in human rights
● Regimes in virtually every Arab state shut down human rights organizations that
emerged in the 1970s and 1980s
○ In the 1990s they were then followed by state institutions tasked with overseeing
human rights practices
○ These state organized human rights organizations were used to suppress outside
human rights organizations and NGOs
● Regimes have retreated from the commanding heights of authoritarianism, repressing
more selectiving, embracing discourses of human rights and democratization, and
opening more space for civic forms of organization than in the past
“Managing Political Contestation”
● In recent years the Arab world has seen growing levels of political competition, increased
attention from regimes to issues of electoral reform, and a widespread sense of progress
in the liberalization, if not the democratization, of electoral arenas
○ Egypt, Algeria, Yemen, and Morocco have all modified electoral laws to improve
voter participation, ease restrictions on political competition, and strengthen
oversight and administration of elections
■ In some instances, these reforms have produced real gains
● Foreign officials have praised regimes for these changes
● However, there is less change than meets the eye
○ These election changes are more about making elections safe for
authoritarianism
● Opposition activities and leaders seen as especially threatening become targets of
regime coercion and repression (e.g. in Egypt)
● In Algeria, Egypt, and Syria these countries continue to be governed under emergency
security laws that have been in force for decades, exposing opposition activists and
parties to charges of subversion, treason, and violation of emergency statutes
● Legal frameworks also fragment and disorganize political oppositions
○ Opposition parties are subjected to arbitrary regulation, restriction to media, and
abuse of state authority to repress voter participation during elections, along with
fraud during elections
Document Summary
Authoritarianism in the arab world is stronger than ever despite the efforts of the us, the. While u. s. conceptions of arab authoritarianism and u. s. strategies for promoting democratic reform have remained largely unchanged during this period, arab regimes have not stood still. After twenty years, arab regimes have become proficient at containing and disarming democracy promotion - if not exploiting it for their own purposes. Two openings hold out particular promise, though both will require substantial adjustments in u. s. democracy promotion policies. First, adapting u. s. democracy promotion policies to exploit more effectively the openings that upgrading itself produces. Second, taking steps to weaken the coalitions on which upgrading depends. In recent years, a new model of authoritarian governance has emerged in a number of key arab states. They have expanded political spaces - electoral arenas in particular - where controlled forms of political contestation can occur. They have also tempered their opposition to islamist political participation.
