POLS 4720E Chapter Notes - Chapter 3: Stephen Breyer, Summary Judgment, William Rehnquist
29 Jun 2018
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Arrests:
I. Florida v. Bostick (1991)
A. Facts — In Broward County, Florida, Sheriff's Department officers regularly boarded
buses during stops to ask passenger for permission to search their luggage. Terrance
Bostick, a passenger, was questioned by two officers who sought permission to search his
belongings and advised him of his right to refuse. After obtaining Bostick's permission,
the officers searched his bags, found cocaine, and arrested him on drug trafficking
charges. Bostick filed a motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that it was
illegally obtained, but the trial court denied the motion. Following an affirmance and
certification from the Florida Court of Appeals, the State Supreme Court held that the bus
searches were per se unconstitutional because police did not afford passengers the
opportunity to "leave the bus" in order to avoid questioning. Florida appealed and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
B. Question — Is the acquisition of evidence during random bus searches, conducted
pursuant to passengers' consent, a per se violation of the Fourth Amendment's protection
against unconstitutional search and seizure?
C. Decision — 6-3 Decision for Florida
D. Summary — No — The Court, in a 6-to-3 decision, noted that when deciding if a search
request is overly coercive, within a confined space such as a bus, one must not look at
whether a party felt "free to leave," but whether a party felt free to decline or terminate
the search encounter. The Court held that in the absence of intimidation or harassment,
Bostick could have refused the search request. Moreover, the fact that he knew the search
would produce contraband had no bearing on whether his consent was voluntarily
obtained. The test of whether a "reasonable person" felt free to decline or terminate a
search presupposes his or her innocence.
II. US v. Watson (1975)
A. Facts — On August 17, 1972, a postal inspector received information from an informant
that the respondent, Henry Ogle Watson, was in possession of stolen credit cards. The
informant had provided the inspector with reliable information in the past, and, later that
day, provided the inspector with a stolen card. The inspector asked the informant to
arrange another meeting with Watson to deliver more stolen cards. At the meeting on
August 23, when the informant gave the signal, officers revealed themselves and arrested
Watson. The officers read Watson his Miranda warning and searched him but did not find
the cards on his person. They asked to search his car, and Watson gave them permission.
In the car, officers found two stolen cards. Watson was then charged with four counts of
possessing stolen mail. Prior to the trial, Watson moved to suppress the cards by claiming
his arrest was illegal because there was no warrant, and that the search of his car was
involuntary because he was not informed that he could withhold consent. The motion
was denied and Watson was convicted. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed and held that the arrest was unconstitutional because the postal inspector had
sufficient time to obtain a warrant but failed to do so. The Court of Appeals also held that
the subsequent search was coerced and hence unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment.
B. Question — Did the arrest and following search of the respondent’s car violate his Fourth
Amendment rights?
C. Decision — 6-2 decision for U.S.
D. Summary — No. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the 6-2 majority. The
Court held that postal inspectors have the power to execute an arrest without a warrant
when there is probable cause. Congress has granted this power to several federal
agencies, not just the postal service. Because Watson’s arrest was constitutional, the
search of his car was not the product of an illegal arrest. The Court held that there was no
evidence that Watson was coerced into agreeing to the car search. In his concurring
opinion, Justice Lewis F. Powell wrote that there was established historical precedent for
warrantless arrests. He also argued that interpreting the Fourth Amendment as always
requiring a warrant prior to arrest would severely and negatively impact effective law
enforcement. Justice Potter Stewart wrote a concurring opinion where he argued that the
arrest occurred with probable cause, in broad daylight, in a public place and thus did not
violate the Fourth Amendment. He also held that the majority’s decision in this case does
not set any precedent regarding under what circumstances an officer may make a
warrantless arrest in a private place. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissent and
argued that the majority’s opinion grants police broad powers to make warrantless arrests
and breaks with precedents already set regarding the Warrant Clause of the Fourth
Amendment. He argued that the majority’s opinion goes beyond the bounds of the case in
question and misinterprets common law history. He wrote that the Fourth Amendment
was intended to protect people, not places, and that the interests of the people would be
best served with a warrant requirement. The warrant requirement would not unduly
burden the police because there is no reason to assume that it would cause any delay in
an arrest, unless exigent circumstances are present, in which case the arrest may be made
without a warrant. He also argued that the government did not meet its burden to show
that Watson’s consent was not coerced. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the
dissent. Justice John Paul Stevens took no part in the discussion or decision in this case.
III. California v. Hodari (1990)
A. Facts — Two police officers dressed in street clothes and wearing jackets with the word
“Police” on the front and back were on patrol in Oakland, California in an unmarked car.
As they approached a group of youths near Foothill Blvd. and 63rd Ave., the youths
panicked and ran. One of the officers left the car and ran after Hodari D. Hodari tossed
away something that looked like a small rock just before the officer tackled him and
handcuffed him. The officer retrieved the rock, which turned out to be crack cocaine. At
trial, Hodari moved to suppress evidence relating to the cocaine, arguing that the officer
obtained it during an unlawful search and seizure. The trial court denied the motion. The
California Court of Appeal reversed, holding that Hodari was “seized” when he saw the
officer running towards him and that seizure was unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. The California Supreme Court denied the state’s application for review.
B. Question — Has a person who is not under the physical control of a police officer been
"seized" under the Fourth Amendment when the officer is chasing that person? and Can a
person who is pursued by a police officer avoid prosecution by discarding incriminating
evidence and asserting that he did so out of fear of an unlawful search?
C. Decision — 7-2 Decision for California
D. Summary — No. No. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for a 7-2 majority, reversed and
remanded. The Supreme Court held that a Fourth Amendment seizure requires some sort
of physical force with lawful authority, or submission to an assertion of authority. Hodari
had not been touched when he discarded the cocaine, and had not submitted to authority
because he was still attempting to escape. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, writing
that a seizure takes place when a police officer conveys the message that a citizen is not
free to leave. In this situation, when the officer started chasing Hodari, he made it clear
that Hodari was not free to leave. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.
IV. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista (2001)
A. Facts — Under Texas law, it is a misdemeanor, punishable only by a fine, either for a
front-seat passenger in a car equipped with safety belts not to wear one or for the driver
to fail to secure any small child riding in front. In 1997, Gail Atwater was driving her
truck in Lago Vista. Neither of Atwater's children, who were sitting in the front seat, was
wearing seatbelts. Lago Vista policeman Bart Turek observed the violations and pulled
Atwater over. Ultimately, Atwater was handcuffed, placed in jail, and released on bond.
Atwater then filed suit alleging that Turek's actions had violated her Fourth Amendment
right to be free from unreasonable seizure. In granting the city summary judgment, the
District Court ruled the claim meritless. In affirming, the en banc Court of Appeals held
that the arrest was not unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes because no one
disputed that Turek had probable cause to arrest Atwater, and there was no evidence the
arrest was conducted in an extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to Atwater's privacy
interests.
B. Question — Does the Fourth Amendment, either by incorporating common-law
restrictions on misdemeanor arrests or otherwise, limit a police officer's authority to
arrest without warrant for minor criminal offenses?
C. Decision — 5-4 decision for City of Lago Vista
D. Summary — No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held
that the Fourth Amendment does not forbid a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal
offense, such as a misdemeanor seatbelt violation punishable only by a fine. "If an officer
has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor
criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest
the offender," wrote Justice Souter for the Court. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's
dissenting opinion argued that the Court's decision "neglects the Fourth Amendment's
express command in the name of administrative ease" and thus "cloaks the pointless
indignity that Gail Atwater suffered with the mantle of reasonableness."
Stops:
I. Terry v. Ohio (1967)
A. Facts — Terry and two other men were observed by a plain clothes policeman in what
the officer believed to be "casing a job, a stick-up." The officer stopped and frisked the
Document Summary
Arrests: florida v. bostick (1991, facts in broward county, florida, sheriff"s department officers regularly boarded buses during stops to ask passenger for permission to search their luggage. Bostick, a passenger, was questioned by two officers who sought permission to search his belongings and advised him of his right to refuse. After obtaining bostick"s permission, the officers searched his bags, found cocaine, and arrested him on drug trafficking charges. Bostick filed a motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained, but the trial court denied the motion. The court held that in the absence of intimidation or harassment, Moreover, the fact that he knew the search would produce contraband had no bearing on whether his consent was voluntarily obtained. The test of whether a "reasonable person" felt free to decline or terminate a search presupposes his or her innocence.
