HISTORY 224 Chapter Notes - Chapter 3: Deterrence Theory
Document Summary
Weak and poor states can manage to deploy second-strike forces which (cid:272)o(cid:374)tradi(cid:272)ts aga(cid:374)"s (cid:271)elief that se(cid:272)o(cid:374)d-strike forces are difficult to build and deploy. The effectiveness of nuclear deterrence rests on uncertainty because no o(cid:374)e (cid:272)a(cid:374) (cid:271)e sure that a (cid:373)ajor (cid:272)o(cid:374)(cid:448)e(cid:374)tio(cid:374)al atta(cid:272)k o(cid:374) (cid:374)u(cid:272)lear (cid:272)ou(cid:374)try"s vital interests will not escalate to the nuclear level, it is deterred. A (cid:271)ig reaso(cid:374) for a(cid:373)eri(cid:272)a"s resistance to the spread of nuclear weapons is that if (cid:449)eak (cid:272)ou(cid:374)tries ha(cid:448)e so(cid:373)e they (cid:862)(cid:449)ill (cid:272)ra(cid:373)p our style(cid:863) It is hard to believe that nuclear war may begin accidentally, when less frightening conventional wars have rarely done so. In a conventional world, uncertainty may tempt a country to join battle. In a nuclear world, uncertainty has the opposite effect. What is not controllable is too dangerous to bear: missile defenses and the multiplication of nuclear weapons. The strong can deter the strong and the weak can deter the strong, but the strong cannot deter the weak.
