ECON 440 Lecture 13: Lecture 13 - Demand for Health Care

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Elasticity of demand for health care
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Why it matters: normative and positive
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The Magnitude of Moral Hazard Consumption
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The RAND Health Insurance Experiment
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The Oregon Health Insurance Experiment
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Tamblyn et al, 2001
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Shigeoka 2014
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Implications for Policy
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Outline
Reducing risk
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Reducing variance in outcomes
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Why health insurance?
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Individuals who are risk averse have a higher utility when they face less uncertainty and less risk
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Risk aversion
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Makes sense to consume it [healthcare services]
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When people face a lower price for medical care, they, as a rational decision maker, will consume care with a
lower marginal benefit as long as the marginal benefit is above the price you have to pay
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If this is true, then this is a source of inefficiency and deadweight loss
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i.e., they're consuming services less valuable to them than the cost to society!
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Now, people are consuming services where the marginal benefit is less than the total cost of care to society
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Main cost of health insurance from an efficiency perspective?
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The payer doesn't have perfect information about whether certain services are optimal for patients to
consume or not
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How price elastic is demand for medical care?
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How large the moral hazard deadweight loss is depends on quantity shifts when price declines (simple
function of elasticity)
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Moral Hazard
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Benefits from health insurance
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Costs of health insurance
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The First Fundamental Tradeoff of health economics (Zeckhauser's dilemma)
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Do you make cost-sharing 0, 50%, $20?
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This can happen around the size of the deductible
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The main policies for managing MH target what is the price the patient has to pay when they consume
services
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Broad agreement about the potential for MH to exist in the context of health insurance, but debate about its
magnitude and appropriate policy interventions
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Does the demand curve reflect the MB of individuals?
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Positive perspective - what do we actually know?
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Quantifying the costs depends crucially on measuring the elasticity of demand for health care
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From the last class…
Cost-sharing: the insurer is sharing the cost of care with the patient
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User fees - idea is that you pay something out of pocket
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"cost-sharing" or "user fees"
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Coinsurance - the patient pays a fixed dollar amount (instead of paying 20%, the physician pays $50
fixed, and the insurance pays the rest)
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Can take the form of coinsurance or co-payments
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Deductibles and maximum expenditure limits also affect cost-sharing
Primary interest wrt price - what does price mean in this context? →the price of the medical care service
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Demand Elasticity
Lecture 13 - Demand for Health Care
Wednesday, February 21, 2018
10:06 AM
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After the $200 is spent, the insurance helps pay for it in increments
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Deductibles - for example, the insurance policy will stipulate that of the first $200 you spend on medical
care in a given year, you pay 100% of that
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The maximum expenditure is limited: patients will at maximum pay 3k out of pocket all year (after this
amount insurance will pay for everything 100%)
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Deductibles and maximum expenditure limits also affect cost-sharing
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If you make patients wait too long, or…
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Time-price
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e.g., making patients travel far
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Other costs (hassles)
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These can both affect demand
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Can also consider elasticity wrt:
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i.e., if you're already sick, you might have less elastic demand than if you're relatively healthy
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Individuals: SES, health status, etc.
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Not all health care services are the same - some will be more price elastic than others
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Health care services: inpatient, Rx, emergency care, preventive services, etc.
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Variation across:
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Medical Care Demand
We're not worried about MH when it comes to having a heart attack (i.e., it's not really a choice -
people can't induce a heart attack)
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Think more massage therapy, etc
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When you change the slope of the demand curve, this changes elasticity
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The slope of the demand curve for sick people is steeper
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Different elasticities have different implications for deadweight loss
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Increased quantity due to lower out-of-pocket price
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Increased price/quality of services due to insulation from price (assuming a higher price reflects more
value)
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Services that would be consumed in the absence of insurance
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Increased price, quantity, and quality
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Services that wouldn't be purchased without insurance
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Insurance imposes increased costs on society (ex post)
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In sum: there are some services a patient may not choose to pay for in expectation, but now, because it's cheaper,
they will consume it
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MB < full cost to society: source of allocative efficiency
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Then, the empirical demand curve we estimate does reflect the true marginal benefits to these individuals
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If patients have good information, they can use this information and understand the benefits to them of these
consumption decisions
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Welfare Losses from "Excess" HI
Not only might there be efficiency impacts in a point in time, but, when individuals face lower prices for care, they
use more services
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Dynamic Impacts of Moral Hazard
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Document Summary

Individuals who are risk averse have a higher utility when they face less uncertainty and less risk. When people face a lower price for medical care, they, as a rational decision maker, will consume care with a lower marginal benefit as long as the marginal benefit is above the price you have to pay. Now, people are consuming services where the marginal benefit is less than the total cost of care to society. If this is true, then this is a source of inefficiency and deadweight loss i. e. , they"re consuming services less valuable to them than the cost to society! The payer doesn"t have perfect information about whether certain services are optimal for patients to consume or not. How large the moral hazard deadweight loss is depends on quantity shifts when price declines (simple function of elasticity) The first fundamental tradeoff of health economics (zeckhauser"s dilemma)

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