POLI 244 Lecture 11: POLI 244 10-17-2016
8 May 2017
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Document Summary
Usually have multiple equilibrium strategies, where neither has an incentive to change their strategy. Thus, communication is the most substantial obstacle to coordination. For example, ussr and us would be best not doing an arms race but fear or temptation both arm themselves. Communication and promises may still lead to armament. Cheating is the main problem because the outcome both prefer is not in equilibrium. A one shot game of this makes it challenging to avoid mutual defection. Is the mutual cooperation outcome"s payoff higher than that of the mutual defection. Need to form a contract of some sort but anarchy makes it tough to enforce. Also depends on whether or not there is a cooperation problem. If the strategic setting is changed it can foster cooperation. Unilateral measures switching from offensive to defensive weapons to give off the that exploitation will not bring as many gains via surprise attack signal.
