POLI 244 Lecture Notes - Lecture 31: Social Imperialism, Repeated Game, Strategic Dominance
12 Mar 2016
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Document Summary
Coordination and collaboration: regimes in an anarchic world. Arthur a. stein regimes: can constitute international interactions or be defined as international institutions. Dilemmas of common interests arises when independent decision making leads to equilibrium outcomes that are pareto-deficient: outcomes in which all actors prefer another given outcome to the equilibrium outcome. Failure of market forces to result in optimal solutions, such as market rationality: eg. Regime change same factors for regime formation explain regime maintenance, change, and dissolution. Maintained as longa s patterns of interest that give rise to them remain. Three dimensions in explaining cooperation and as targets of long term strategies that promote cooperation: defines, explains accounts for cooperation. May evolve into less chalenning stag hunt if gains from mutual cooperation. Cc increases relative to gains from explotation dc. More substantial gains from mutual cooperation, less substantial gains from games that are not repeated, preferences matter sing-play conditions payoffs affect the likelihood of cooperation unilateral defection.
