POLI 354 Lecture Notes - Lecture 8: Domino Theory, Free Trade, Pareto Efficiency
13 May 2018
School
Department
Course
Professor
POLI%358% % Winter%2018%
Poli%358%Lecture%7:%Explaining%the%Design%of%International%Organizations%
6th%February%2018%
%
Legend:%normal%text-%from%slides;%italics:(what(the(professor(said(in(class,(over(and(above(the(slides(
%
Design%of%international%Institutions%
%
Table%of%contents%
- The%rational%design%of%international%institutions%
- Broader,%deeper%take-off%
o Cant%have%large%number%of%trader%countries%
%
Schedule%–Midterm%
%
Key%Readings:%
- Tit-for-tat-%Axelrod%
- NIE-%Gilligan%
- HST-Snidal%
- Negotiation-%Fearon%and%Vreland%%-%why%dictators%sign%into%treaties%
- Compliance-%Fearon%and%Tomz%(audience%costs)%
- Interest%groups-%Bailey%et%al%%(RTAA)%and%Baccini%and%Dur%(domino%theory)%
- Institutions-%McGillivary%and%Smith%
- 5(topics(will(come(on(the(midterm(exam(
%
Recap%
- Selectorate%theory%
o Why(the(size(of(the(selectorate(changes(the(incentives(of(the(leader(to(provide(
public(or(private(goods(%
o Harder(to(replace(autocratic(leader-(costs(and(risks(of(exclusion(as(a(consequence(of(
defection%
§ Cost-(don’t(get(the(benefits(of(private(goods(that(you(were(getting(before(
defection%
o Leader%specific%punishment%%
%
What%have%we%seen%so%far%
- What%explains%cooperation-%the(effect(of(the(following(things(on(cooperation%
o HST%
o Interest%groups%
o Institutions%
- These(explain(that(when(countries(cooperate-(face(dichotomous(choice-(cooperate(or(not-(
don’t(have(a(theory(to(explain(why(some(cooperation(is(deep(and(some(are(not%
POLI%358% % Winter%2018%
o Same(type(of(agreements-(trade(agreements-(differ(a(lot(in(the(design-(need(a(
theory(to(explain(the(differences%
- These%theories%of%not%help%explaining%the%great%deal%of%variation%across%international%
institutions%
%
Variation%across%trade%agreements%
%
%
%
%
- how(heterogeneous(PTAs(are(–(show(this(in(the(second(diagram-(show(that(some(
agreements(include(a(lot(of(provisions(related(to(liberalization-(services,(investment,(IPR
à
(
variation(in(treaties.(%
- Variation(in(terms(of(commitment-(how(much(countries(deviate(after(signing(the(
agreement%
- Shifts(debate(from(cooperation(or(not(to(which(kind(of(cooperation%
%
POLI%358% % Winter%2018%
Research%questions%
- what%explains%the%large%heterogeneity%across%the%same%type%of%agreements?%
- Why%do%countries%include%or%exclude%specific%provisions%in/from%an%international%treaty?%
- Which%cooperation%rather%than%why%cooperation%
o See(which(cooperation(instead(of(why%
%
The%design%of%international%institutions%%
- International%institutions%should%be%defined%differently,%depending%on:%
o Obstacles%that%must%be%overcome%
§ Focus(of(today%%
o Preferences%of%domestic%actors%
§ Preferences(of(interest(group-(can(also(help(us(understand(which(type(of(
cooperation(we(see-(deep(or(shallow(%
- How%do%we%operationalize%the%design%of%international%institutions?%
o Possible(dimensions(that(allow(institutions(to(vary(%
- Koremenos,%Lipson%and%Snidal%(2001)%
o Different%dimensions%of%the%design%of%institutions%and%see%why%some%are%deep%in%
some%dimensions%and%others%are%shallow%%
%
Five%dependent%variables%
- Membership%rules%(MEMBERSHIP)%
o Exclusive%(restrictive)%vs%inclusive%
§ Not(everyone(can(come(in(or(open(to(all%
o Regional%vs%universal%%
§ Restricted(by(geographic(location(or(open(to(all%
§ (UN(is(inclusive(and(universal(%
§ WTO(is(restrictive-(need(to(be(accepted(by(other(countries,(but(universal%
§ NAFTA-(restrictive(and(regional(also(EU%
o Only%states%vs%non-state%actors%
§ Which(actors(can(be(part-(for(long(time(non-state(actors(coulf(not(enter(the(
WTO-(NGOS(and(activists(argued(that(WTO(was(focused(on(liberalization(
without(considering(the(negative(externalities%
§ They’re(also(allowed(to(participate(in(DSM-(environmental(NGOS(can(point(
out(damages(of(trade(liberalization(%
- Scope%of%issues%covered%(SCOPE)%
o One%issue%vs%several%issues%
§ Some(regulate(only(one(single(issue%
o Examples:%
§ 1965%US%Canada%auto%trade%deal%
§ trade%agreements%limited%to%services%
§ NAFTA-%about(trade(liberalization(not(only(about(one(sector(or(industry(but(
across(all(of(them(%
- Centralization%of%tasks%(CENTRALIZATION)%
o How(much(an(institution(is(centralized(on(the(bodies(that(are(specific(to(the(
institutions%
o Information-%weakest%form%of%centralization%
Document Summary
Poli 358 lecture 7: explaining the design of international organizations. Legend: normal text- from slides; italics: what the professor said in class, over and above the slides. Broader, deeper take-off: cant have large number of trader countries. Negotiation- fearon and vreland - why dictators sign into treaties. 5 topics will come on the midterm exam. Interest groups- bailey et al (rtaa) and baccini and dur (domino theory) Selectorate theory: why the size of the selectorate changes the incentives of the leader to provide public or private goods, harder to replace autocratic leader- costs and risks of exclusion as a consequence of defection. Cost- don"t get the benefits of private goods that you were getting before defection: leader specific punishment. What explains cooperation- the effect of the following things on cooperation: hst. These explain that when countries cooperate- face dichotomous choice- cooperate or not- don"t have a theory to explain why some cooperation is deep and some are not.
