POLI 354 Lecture Notes - Lecture 3: Collective Action, Hegemonic Stability Theory, Kenneth Waltz
13 May 2018
School
Department
Course
Professor
POLI%358%Notes% % Winter%2018%%
Poli%358-%Lecture%3:%Problem%of%cooperation%under%anarchy%
16th%January%2018%
%
Legend:%normal%text-%from%slides;%italics:(what(the(professor(said(in(class,(over(and(above(the(slides(
%
Recap%
- Benefits%from%international%regimes:%
o Long%shadow%of%the%future%à%tit-for-tat%à%pareto%efficient%equilibria%
o Constraining%countries’%behaviours%à%increasing%information%à%reducing%
transaction%costs%
- TC%and%international%regimes:%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
- Gilligan’s%Argument%
o Measurement%error%
o Selection%bias-%even(when(transaction(costs(are(large,(need(to(see(them(against(the(
benefits%
§ If(the(benefits(are(larger(than(the(costs,(then(the(countries(go(for(the(
institutions%
§ Also(need(to(consider(future(transaction(costs%
%
Today;%
- Explain%how%cooperation%emerge-%ie%hegemonic%stability%theory%(HST)% %
o Cooperation(makes(sense(even(if(countries(behave(in(utilitarian(ways%
o Who(is(responsible(for(establishing(institutions(and(cooperation%
- Assess%the%validity%of%HST%
o Realist(approach-(powerful(states(are(responsible(for(establishing(cooperation%
- Correct%its%shortcomings%using%liberal%institutionalism%–%developed(in(the(late(1980s(to(
address(the(shortcomings(of(HST%
%
Realism%%
- 4%main%assumptions%
o anarchy%
o unitary%actors-%states(are(the(main(actors%
o self-interest-%maximize(their(own(utility(function%
o relative%gains-%Kenneth(Waltz%
§ zero-sum(games-(payoffs(of(cooperation(are(larger(than(the(ones(of(no(
cooperation%
POLI%358%Notes% % Winter%2018%%
- 2%problems%for%cooperation%
o power-%hard(to(force(the(powerful(countries(to(comply(with(international(rules(%
o collective%action%problem%–%to(solve(this(we(need(HST%
%
The%problem%of%asymmetric%power%
- power%à%asymmetric%costs%of%cooperation%
o the%US%market%is%more%important%for%Canadian%exporters%than%the%Canadian%market%
is%more%important%for%US%exporters%
o power(can(be(an(underlining(variable(in(international(cooperation%
o difficult(to(neutralize(international(interactions%
o we(do(have(other(tools(to(make(powerful(countries(cooperate-(retaliation(%
- how%can%we%make%sure%that%the%asymmetric%costs%of%non-cooperation’s%are%not%used%as%
leverage%against%other%states?%
o After%opening%Canada’s%markets,%the%US%could%threaten%to%close%the%border%if%
Canada%does%not%support%the%US%I%Iraq-%how%can%we%enforce%NAFTA?%
%
The%problem%of%collective%actions%
- Cooperation%as%a%public%good:%
o Non-excludable%
o Non-rivalrous%
o Examples%
§ Lighthouse,%clean%air,%national%defense%%
- Collective%action%problems:%
o Large%groups%often%fail%to%organize%if%the%benefits%are%non-excludable,%I.e.,%if%you%can%
free-ride%on%group%efforts%
§ Free(riders-(actors(who(don’t(pay(the(costs(of(the(goods(because(they(know(
they(can(enjoy(the(benefits(of(the(goods(without(paying(the(cost%
o Examples?%Consumers-%they(should(lobby(for(low(prices(of(goods,(this(is(why(trade(
policy(is(usually(lobbied(for(by(big(cooperations%
%
Key%questions%for%today’s%class%
- If%the%collective%action%problem%is%severe,%who%is%paying%the%cost%of%establishing%
cooperation%in%the%first%place%
- When%and%how%does%cooperation%emerge?%
%
Periods%of%Openness%and%Hegemony%
- hegemon(is(willing(to(pay(the(cost(of(
cooperation(and(establish(the(international(
organizations(that(benefit(everyone%
- period(with(a(clear(hegemon-(there(was(
more(cooperation-(proxy(with(openness%
- during(the(19th(century-(UK(was(the(
hegemon-(first(period(of(globalization%
- after(WW2-(US(was(the(hegemon(in(the(system-(in(charge(of(keeping(the(international(
economic(system%
- between(the(tow(world(wars-(no(clear(hegemon(UK(declined(and(US(wanted(isolation-(
period(of(closure-(very(protectionist(policies(
à
(higher(tariffs(and(collapse(of(the(gold(
standard.(%
Document Summary
Poli 358- lecture 3: problem of cooperation under anarchy. Legend: normal text- from slides; italics: what the professor said in class, over and above the slides. Benefits from international regimes: long shadow of the future tit-for-tat pareto efficient equilibria, constraining countries" behaviours increasing information reducing transaction costs. Gilligan"s argument: measurement error, selection bias- even when transaction costs are large, need to see them against the benefits. If the benefits are larger than the costs, then the countries go for the institutions. Also need to consider future transaction costs. Explain how cooperation emerge- ie hegemonic stability theory (hst: cooperation makes sense even if countries behave in utilitarian ways, who is responsible for establishing institutions and cooperation. Assess the validity of hst: realist approach- powerful states are responsible for establishing cooperation. Correct its shortcomings using liberal institutionalism developed in the late 1980s to address the shortcomings of hst.
