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Lecture 2

Lecture 2 Notes

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Department
Philosophy
Course
PHIL 105
Professor
Jill Mc Intosh
Semester
Summer

Description
Phil XXI May 14, 2012 Problem with Correspondents Principle: “I am the prof of this class”. - Is that sentence both true and false? What proposition is expressed depends on who says it and to whom Two different tokens (instances) of the same type of sentence can express different propositions • Token: a particular thing • Type: the kind of thing a particular thing is • Facts: the way things are • Propositions: descriptions of the way things (allegedly) are • Knowledge: justified true belief • ~: is called a “tilde” Usually, two tokens of the same type of sentence express the same proposition Ie. “SFU is in Canada.” • Expressing the same proposition Usually, two tokens of different types of sentences express different propositions Ie. “SFU is in Canada.” “Dr. Mc is an alien.” Two tokens of different types of sentences can express the same proposition Ie. “The sky is blue.” “Le ciel est bleu.” What a sentence means depends on context: • What language is being used • Who says it, where, when, and even holding language constant Indexical sentences: • Use such things as “I”, “here”, “that”, “now”.. • Ie. Prof says “I” = her, I say “I” = me, • Ie. “Today is Wednesday”, “that is blue”, “I am the prof of this class” CP didn’t have a good way to handle indexes: • CP1 avoids the problem by referring to proposition, not sentences (p.29) • A consequence of CP1: - Every proposition has exactly one truth value (OTV) o OTV: the property of being true or being false o Therefore, every proposition is either true or false, but not both (p.31) o It does not imply that we know the truth value of all propositions - The truth or falsity of a proposition is not a matter of the way people feel about it o It’s an objective matter Knowledge: justified true belief (S = subject, P = proposition) - S knows P if and only if: 1. S believes P 2. P is true, and 3. S is justified in believing P • First condition: when, for a proposition that S has considered, would that condition not be met? - S believes P is false / S disbelieves P - S suspends judgment about the truth value of P o Therefore there are 3 relevant
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