PSYC 2270H Lecture 6: Week Six
14 Nov 2018
School
Department
Course
Professor
Document Summary
The nature of mental states hilary putnam. Thesis: we should dismiss it because there is a better hypothesis available, functionalism pains and other conscious states are functional states, i. e. transitions from certain causes or inputs to certain effects or outputs. Functionalism versus dualism: this view is usually held by physicalists but it"s also consistent with dualism it doesn"t rule out souls or non-physical minds. A probabilistic automaton could have a soul: but the soul is not playing any explicit role. We"re not relying on it to explain anything: does not rule out dualism, but does not agree with it. Could an alien with a very different kind od brain feel pain: do you even need a brain to feel pain maybe other kinds of physical-makeup would enable sensations of pain. It"s more likely that mental states like pain are multiply realizable can be brought about in different sorts of ways.
