ECO316H1 Lecture : Eco316 Class notes.docx

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ambersnail383

16 Apr 2012

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Rule of interaction: set of strategies available to the player. Forces that drives the interation: preferences of players over customers; payoff (subjective) Eleven stones; two players, the player can pick either one or two stones at one time, player who picks the last stone lose the game. Winning strategy: let the other player pick 3rd last. Equilibrium strategy: the dominant strategy or the only strategy available. It must explain what the player will do in every node and predict what will happen when there is not equilibrium outcome reached. Rules: player 1 places 0, 1 or 3 in cup. Player 2 matches player 1 money or takes p1 many from cup. Player 2: keeps money if he takes from the cup. If p1 and p2 matches, p1 will get 6 and p2 will get 5 with a total of 11 in the case of. Equilibrium strategies (richer than equilibrium outcome, generate more sophisticated conditions.

Related Questions

In a game, a Nash equilibrium is reached only if the players:

a. understand the game and the payoffs associated with each strategy.

b. use backward induction method to develop their strategies.

c. follow a mixed strategy.

d. have no best response to the choices made by other players.

pearmarten211

Suppose that two players are playing the following game. Player A can choose either Top or Bottom, and Player B can choose either Left or Right. The payoffs are given in the following table:
Player A: LEFT RIGHT
TOP 2 5 | 1 4
BOTTOM 0 1 | 3 8

where the number on the left is the payoff to Player A, and the number on the right is the payoff to Player B.

A) (1 point) Does player A have a dominant strategy, and if so what is it?

B) (1 point) Does player B have a dominant strategy and if so what is it?

C) (4 points) For each of the following say True if the strategy combination is a Nash equilibrium, and False if it is not a Nash equilibrium:

i) Player A plays Top and Player B plays Left

ii) Player A plays Bottom and Player B plays Left

iii) Player A plays Top and Player B plays Right

iv) Player A plays Bottom and Player B plays Right

D) (2 points) If each player plays her maximin strategy what will be the outcome of the game? (Give your answer in terms of the strategies each player chooses

bluelouse209

Suppose that two players are playing the following game. Player A can choose either Top or Bottom, and Player B can choose either Left or Right. The payoffs are given in the following table:

Where the number on the left is the payoff to Player A, and the number on the right is the payoff to Player B.

A) (1 point) Does player A have a dominant strategy, and if so what is it?

B) (1 point) Does player B have a dominant strategy and if so what is it?

C) (4 points) For each of the following say true if the strategy combination is a Nash equilibrium, and false if it is not a Nash equilibrium:

i) Player A plays Top and Player B plays Left

ii) Player A plays Bottom and Player B plays Left

iii) Player A plays Top and Player B plays Right

iv) Player A plays Bottom and Player B plays Right

D) (2 points) If each player plays her maximin strategy what will be the outcome of the game? (Give your answer in terms of the strategies each player chooses)

coffeemarten373

ECO316H1 Lecture : Eco316 Class notes.docx

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