Philosophy 2700F/G Lecture Notes - Lecture 2: Monism, Schadenfreude, Frigidarium
17 May 2018
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Philosophy 2700G Lecture Notes
1 | P a g e
Week 2: January 16th, Tuesday
- Parfit says we should have high hopes for making progress (towards arriving at some consensus)
- Why? Few have made non-religious ethics their life work
- Non-religious ethics is very young and a recent phenomenon
If we destroy humanity, the outcome is much worse than many believe – compare the three outcomes:
1. Peace
2. A nuclear war that kills 99% of the existing population
3. A nuclear ward that kills 100% of the existing population
Parfit says that the difference between 2 and 3 is greater, than that between 1 and 2. This is
because in #3, you are killing off all of human civilization and human history.
Two groups of people (revisionary philosophers) agree with Parfit – both assume that the world will be
inhabitable for at least another billion years (long enough for the future generations from #2 to sustain
themselves). The difference between 2 and 3 is the difference between a few centuries of civilization,
and the whole of this extra history.
The existence of this future generations is important for Parfit because he believes in the advancement
and progress in ethics – this is only possible if there is a small population of people who can hold on to
previously learned moral knowledge
The two groups of philosophers that agree with Parfit:
- Classical utilitarians: the loss of all akid is ad eause of the ast edutio i the possile
su of happiess.
People: J. Bentham, J.S. Mill, H. Sidgwick
- Ideal utilitarians: the loss of all akid is ad eause the loss of the “iees, the Arts, and
moral progress, or the continued advance towards a wholly just world-ide ouit.
People: H. Rashdall, G.E. Moore
The two groups agree that people should maximize on what is good – that the loss of all of humanity
would be very bad because the highest of these achievements would come in the future centuries.
However, they disagree on what is good – ideal utilitarians believe that there can be more than one
thing that is good (knowledge, arts, moral virtue, etc.); they are pluralists whereas classical utilitarians
tend to be monists.
The highest achievements would come in the Arts and Sciences – that is, non-religious ethics. This is
because belief in God prevented the free development of moral reasoning (free inquiry). Open disbelief
in God is recent; consequently, non-religious ethics is at an early stage. We might reach an agreement in
that we cannot know how it will develop, so it is not unreasonable to have high hopes.
Week 2: January 18th, Thursday
Non-instrumental value
- What things have value? Non-instrumental (intrinsic) value versus instrumental value:
o If something is non-instrumentally valuable, then it is good to have for its own sake, not
just for what it produces or issues in
o If something is instrumentally valuable, then it is good to have at least in part because of
what it produces or issues in
- One thought is that the only thing that has value is happiness (monists): only one thing has value
- The rival of monism is pluralism: more than one thing has value
Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832):
- A defender of this [utilitarian] view
find more resources at oneclass.com
find more resources at oneclass.com
Document Summary
Parfit says we should have high hopes for making progress (towards arriving at some consensus) Few have made non-religious ethics their life work. Non-religious ethics is very young and a recent phenomenon. If we destroy humanity, the outcome is much worse than many believe compare the three outcomes: peace, a nuclear war that kills 99% of the existing population, a nuclear ward that kills 100% of the existing population. Parfit says that the difference between 2 and 3 is greater, than that between 1 and 2. This is because in #3, you are killing off all of human civilization and human history. Two groups of people (revisionary philosophers) agree with parfit both assume that the world will be inhabitable for at least another billion years (long enough for the future generations from #2 to sustain themselves). The difference between 2 and 3 is the difference between a few centuries of civilization, and the whole of this extra history.
