Philosophy 2700F/G Lecture Notes - Lecture 11: Contractualism
17 May 2018
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Week 11: March 29th, Thursday
First order moral beliefs/attitudes: these are outlined by Ross
Philosophical foundations: this is a more basic idea – philosophical utilitarianism and contractualism
- This gives rise to utilitarianism, which then transitions to first order moral views
There is a quick more here to utilitarianism. To reject it, we need to find a theory that is better at
explaining moral argument, moral beliefs and moral motivations. Need to overcome problems with
Rossiais, too: “ustatie moral requirements independent of individual well-being strike people as
ituitioist i a ojetioale sese 8
- He is essentially saying that it makes no sense to base moral ideas, without considering
individual well being
o Ex: when we make promises, the oal asis is fo the etteet of soeoe’s ell-
being. So if carrying out that promise is harmful, it is okay to break that promise
o Thus, Kat’s ase to the Iuiig Mude itiis is oute-intuitive
The alternative: contractualism – a view about the subject matter of morality
- Basi idea: a at is og if its pefoae ude the iustaes ould e disalloed
any system of rules for the general regulation of behaviour which no one could reasonably
reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement
o Informed: excludes false beliefs, superstitions, etc.
o Unforced: excludes coercion, weak bargaining positions, etc.
o Agreement is about agreement among people who want to find principles that no one
can reasonably reject.
- Who counts? Beings with a point of view
*This is not normatively neutral because it has the idea of reasonable rejection. The reasons which
ould allo fo ejetio of a piiple ae oe geei i.e. soe ha to oe’s ell-being is a
good reason to reject certain principles). Another major reason for rejection (or acceptance of a
piiple is otiatio i.e. ufoed
- Motivation: a desie to justif oe’s atios to othes o gouds that the ould ot
reasonably accept. We are strongly motivated to justify our actions to each other
“alo’s eaple seaio: tade-off situation – if you have surplus goods, and you can distribute it
to one of two groups of people (one group consists of one person, and the other group consists of
five people; all the people in both groups are of equal conditions and the harm that will befall as a
result of your decision is equal). You cannot distribute it to both groups:
- Utilitarians: you should give it to the group with five people because it would result in a
greater overall happiness. If both groups contained 1 person, then you can choose any
- Ross: you need to consider all your moral duties (i.e. duties of fidelity, gratitude, etc.)
- Contractualists: your principle must be so that no can reasonably reject it – so the claims to
the surplus goods is an individual claim. You use a tie-breaker argument – the extra people
in the larger group breaks the tie between the first two people in each group. So you save
the group with the greater number, not because of surplus happiness, but because this
allows for a more equal consideration for distribution of the goods.
But if the conditions were different? If the harm done to one group is higher than that to another
group:
- Contractualists: you should favour the group that will experience more harm (so as to
reduce that suffering) – weigh his pain into your tie-breaker. You need to consider
individual claims. So they would want you help the group that would experience more harm
find more resources at oneclass.com
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Document Summary
First order moral beliefs/attitudes: these are outlined by ross. Philosophical foundations: this is a more basic idea philosophical utilitarianism and contractualism. This gives rise to utilitarianism, which then transitions to first order moral views. There is a quick more here to utilitarianism. To reject it, we need to find a theory that is better at explaining moral argument, moral beliefs and moral motivations. Rossia(cid:374)is(cid:373), too: (cid:862) u(cid:271)sta(cid:374)ti(cid:448)e moral requirements independent of individual well-being strike people as i(cid:374)tuitio(cid:374)ist i(cid:374) a(cid:374) o(cid:271)je(cid:272)tio(cid:374)a(cid:271)le se(cid:374)se(cid:863) (cid:894)(cid:1005)(cid:1004)8(cid:895) He is essentially saying that it makes no sense to base moral ideas, without considering individual well being: ex: when we make promises, the (cid:373)o(cid:396)al (cid:271)asis is fo(cid:396) the (cid:271)ette(cid:396)(cid:373)e(cid:374)t of so(cid:373)eo(cid:374)e"s (cid:449)ell- being. So if carrying out that promise is harmful, it is okay to break that promise: thus, ka(cid:374)t"s a(cid:374)s(cid:449)e(cid:396) to the i(cid:374)(cid:395)ui(cid:396)i(cid:374)g mu(cid:396)de(cid:396) (cid:272)(cid:396)iti(cid:272)is(cid:373) is (cid:272)ou(cid:374)te(cid:396)-intuitive. The alternative: contractualism a view about the subject matter of morality.
